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Abstract
We draw from documented characteristics of the biopharmaceutical industry to construct a
model where two firms can choose to outsource R&D to an external unit, and/or engage in in-
ternal R&D, before competing in a final market. We investigate the tension between outsourced
and internal operations, the distribution of profits among market participants, and the incentives
to coordinate outsourcing activities, or to integrate R&D and production. Consistent with the
empirical evidence, we find that: (1) each firm’s internal R&D activity is monotonic in the tech-
nology received from the external unit, and the sign of the relationship does not depend on the
technology received or generated by the competitor; (2) a measure of direct and indirect techno-
logical externalities drives the distribution of industry profits, with lower returns to an external
unit involved in research (drug discovery) than in development (clinical trials); (3) upstream entry
is stimulated by the long-term perspective for the external unit’s owners to earn a larger share of
industry profits by selling out assets to a client firm than by running operations. However, in the
case of early-stage research, the delinkage of investment incentives from industry value, and the
vulnerability of investors’ returns to negative shocks, both suggest the abandonment of projects
with economic and medical value as a likely consequence of R&D outsourcing.
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1 Introduction
There is evidence that pharmaceutical firms that engage in internal R&D (research and development)
increasingly outsource specific tasks. Morton and Kyle (2012) report a worldwide compound annual
growth rate of 16.6% in contract R&D, with expenses rising from US$ 14 billion in 2003 to 47 billion
in 2011. This trend is viewed as an attempt to reverse a decline in R&D productivity observed over
several decades (Munos, 2009; Pammolli et al., 2011; Mestre-Ferrandiz et al., 2012).
While the number of new molecular entities and biologics that are approved annually by the US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has remained around the same level since 1950, when mea-
sured per billion US dollars spent on R&D this number has halved roughly every 9 years (Scannell
et al., 2012). Although the reasons for this long-term decline are multiple, industry experts point
to technological challenges as a key driver of the rise in R&D costs. The scale of the productivity
problem can be gauged by considering changes in the average full cost estimate of bringing a new
compound to the market. This estimate is $451 million in DiMasi et al. (1991), $1,031 million in Di-
Masi et al. (2013), and $2,558 million in DiMasi et al. (2016).1 Despite this cost escalation, as gross
margins have evolved in parallel with R&D spending (Scherer, 2001, 2010), the net profit returns have
remained persistently high at the aggregated industry level.
It is believed in the industry that R&D outsourcing can reduce costs by increasing efficiency in
the discovery and testing steps toward new medicines (Schuhmacher et al., 2016). The tasks that
firms choose to contract out cover a large spectrum of activities, from basic research to late-stage
development, including genetic engineering, target validation, assay development, safety and effi-
cacy tests in animal models, and clinical trials involving human subjects. At the same time, large
pharmaceutical firms invest large amounts of financial resources to acquire specialized innovative
units involved in promising projects. For example, in the oncology domain, recently AbbVie agreed
to buy Pharmacyclics for $21 billion, and Pfizer acquired Medivation for $14 billion. The acquisition
of an independent biotech company by a pharmaceutical firm substitutes for a contractual relation
between the two entities, and the two technology outsourcing alternatives amount to R&D expen-
ditures. Still the high transaction prices observed in the equity market suggest that pharmaceutical
1Here we focus on estimates based on the same methodology to estimate costs, which include out-of-pocket R&D costs
and time cost (i.e., cost of capital). The estimate in DiMasi et al. (2016) is in 2013 prices, and the cost estimates in DiMasi et
al. (1991, 2003) have been updated to US$ 2011 prices in Mestre-Ferrandiz et al. (2012). The latter paper offers a detailed
discussion on the approaches used to estimate the full cost of bringing a new compound to the market.
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firms pay more for R&D by acquiring an external unit than by contracting with it as a client firm, or
by carrying out the R&D internally (Pisano, 2015).
Over the past two decades, a growing stream of economics literature – which we review below
– has investigated a variety of issues that pertain to R&D outsourcing. However, most theoretical
contributions adopt a general approach without specific reference to the particularities of the bio-
pharmaceutical sector, and several empirical analyses offer mixed results that leave important ques-
tions unanswered. Does R&D outsourcing necessarily coincide with a disinvestment of big pharma
firms from internal drug discovery or clinical trial activities? Can technological characteristics of
contracted-out operations, and the nature of the R&D tasks, explain the low average profitability of
biotech units that engage in basic research, or the higher financial returns of contract research orga-
nizations involved in later-stage development? Do big pharma firms effectively pay more for R&D
by acquiring an external unit than by contracting with it? In the end, does cost-efficient outsourcing
necessarily imply a higher productivity in biopharmaceutical R&D?
In order to answer these questions, we draw on documented characteristics of the biopharmaceu-
tical industry to construct a model in which a for-profit independent unit (e.g., a biotech startup, or
a contract research organization) conducts specific tasks as solicited non-cooperatively by two firms
(big pharma), which also run R&D operations internally, before competing in a final market. The
external unit interacts with the two firms by responding to their contractual offers, and can choose
to serve both firms, only one, or none. The firms can substitute internal resources for some or all of
the external unit’s operations, and their contractual offers reflect multi-stage strategic interactions in
the intermediate R&D market and in the final product market. Incentives to pay for outsourced R&D
depend on the exact effects of the received technology, and of the related internal R&D, on the firms’
respective cost and demand conditions. The model allows us (i) to determine whether outsourced
and in-house R&D perform as complements or rather as substitutes, then (ii) to identify technological
drivers of the distribution of profits among the external unit and its sponsors, and (iii) to character-
ize the incentives for the client firms, and the payoff consequences for the upstream investors, to
integrate R&D and production vertically, or to opt for other organizational arrangements.
Overall, the formal results lead to novel theoretical insights on the implications of biopharma-




Our model produces three sets of results. First, we characterize the circumstances in which out-
sourced R&D either stimulates or reduces the internal R&D levels. This is made possible by the
specification that, unlike the models that we know in the theoretical R&D literature, the choices by
the external unit, and by the firms on the demand side of the market for technology, are not a priori
complementary or substitutable. We find that each firm’s equilibrium internal effort level is mono-
tonic in the R&D sourced from the external unit, and that the sign of the relationship does not depend
on the technology received or generated by the competitor. More specifically, a firm’s internal effort
decreases with the outsourced R&D if and only if the gross profits (before incurring R&D costs)
have decreasing returns to the same firm’s own R&D (i.e., the R&D that it specifically buys from the
external unit or that it runs internally). This theoretical characterization echoes the most recent em-
pirical investigations (e.g., Hagedoorn and Wang, 2012; Ceccagnoli, Higgins, and Palermo, 2014) that
show that external and internal R&D, in the biopharmaceutical industry, are neither complements
nor substitutes in general, as the exact connection between the two channels is rooted in complex
specifications that differ across the set of examined cases.
Second, we establish simple conditions on the model primitives for the total equilibrium R&D
benefits to be either fully appropriated by the two firms, or partially retained by the external unit.
These conditions relate to the sign and respective magnitudes of indirect and direct technological
externalities, and can explain the persistently low average profitability of biotech firms (Pisano, 2006,
2010). There are indirect technological externalities if the cost of R&D, as conducted by the external
unit for the two firms, reflects economies or diseconomies of scope. There are direct technologi-
cal externalities if some of the R&D received or produced by a firm impacts the gross profit of its
competitor. Our conditions notably establish that the external unit exactly breaks even (for a zero
economic profit) when the indirect (through the external unit) and direct (inter-firm) externalities are
positive. This first theoretical situation receives empirical support from several investigations that
find evidence of economies of scope and significant knowledge spillovers in early-stage discovery
activities (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Cockburn and Henderson, 2001; Bloom et al., 2013) on
which biotech units focus. This case thus describes circumstances where outsourcing can reduce the
costs of discovering new medicines but still, where investors have no positive incentive to engage
financial resources. And this occurs precisely for the research tasks of the most fundamental nature.
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The risks involved in such technological uncertainties make this situation of market failure even more
problematic. In our model, the contractual transfer payments in fact protect the client firms from the
risk inherent to upstream operations (we illustrate this feature with specific functional forms in sev-
eral examples). With an expected payoff exactly equal to zero in equilibrium, an unfavorable draw in
the distribution implies a negative return and leads the external unit to shut down, although its activ-
ities generate a positive – and possibly very high – profit at the industry level. This outcome suggests
that protection measures for the external unit (e.g., the financial back-up of a partner university) are
necessary to avoid the abandonment of socially valuable research projects.
However, in our model the external unit can also appropriate a positive share – that can be de-
rived analytically – of total profits when the externalities are negative, in which case the client firms
earn only their marginal contribution to the industry profits. This second situation is consistent with
the empirical studies that identify diseconomies of scope and nonexistent spillovers in the late-phase
clinical trials of candidate drugs (Danzon et al. 2005; Macher and Boerner, 2006), such as conducted
by specialized contract research organizations (see section 1.2). In that case the profits to the external
unit are an effect of competition between the contract offers of the two firms for the orientation of
R&D resources toward specific needs. The intensity of that competition depends on the nature of the
R&D activities, both inside the external unit and in the firms’ internal facilities, and then on the effect
of such activities on the downstream cost and demand characteristics, which in the end also impact
final market interactions.
A third set of results connects the technological externality conditions that drive the distribution
of R&D benefits to the firms’ incentives to participate in the equity market. We identify two cate-
gories of situations that depend on the ability of firms to bid or not for the external unit, depending
on financial, managerial, or governance constraints of all kinds. If such constraints are binding, either
positive technological externalities dominate and the firms remain independent, or negative exter-
nalities lead the firms to choose to coordinate horizontally their R&D outsourcing (as in Majewski,
2004). Otherwise, should the firms be unable to commit to not unilaterally considering vertical in-
tegration, one of them does acquire the external unit. Whether one or the other firm is the acquirer
occurs with equiprobability, independently of asymmetries across the two firms. The main outcome
is that the competition for the control of the external unit leads to overbidding (a case discussed in
Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006), and hence to a redistribution of industry profits to the benefit of the
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external unit. This outcome suggests that biotech founders reappropriate in the equity market part
of the value transferred to their sponsors in the R&D market.
1.2 The Industry Context
We derive our theoretical results from model specifications that are carefully related to documented
characteristics of the biopharmaceutical “market for technology” (Arora et al., 2001, 2004), where
the industry usually divides research and development operations into two sets of activities. The
early-stage R (“research”) activities consist in the discovery of new chemical compounds, vaccine
candidates, or other biologics. The later-stage D (“development”) activities aim at assessing the safety
and efficacy of the therapeutic or prophylactic properties of a candidate medicine on increasingly
large populations of individuals. This stage moves toward the approval of a drug or the licensure of
a vaccine by a government agency.
Outsourced R&D activities include early-stage research in the biotechnology field, where from
the early years onward,
“[b]ecause different commercial products were based on similar basic technologies, the
costs ... could be shared by clients” (Pisano, 1991, p. 241) and then “[v]irtually every
new entrant ... formed at least one, and usually several, contractual relationships with
established pharmaceutical (and sometimes chemical) companies” (Pisano, 2006, p. 87).2
A well-documented case is the multi-year collaboration initiated by Merck and Sandoz with
Repligen in 1987 and 1989, respectively, for HIV therapeutics.3 A more recent case involves Cure-
Vac, which contracted with Johnson & Johnson in 2013, and with Sanofi in 2014, for the development
of prophylactic vaccines. Another example involves Moderna Therapeutics, which in 2016 partnered
with AstraZeneca, and a few months later with Merck, to develop RNA-based candidates for the
treatment or prevention of a range of cancers. Accordingly, in our model an external unit can serve
up to two client firms simultaneously.
Another important characteristic of the current market for biotechnology is that established phar-
maceutical firms do not only give a biotech firm (external unit) access to finance and to manufactur-
2According to Higgins (2007), who uses a large data set of alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry, from 1994 to 2001
each biotechnology firms had on average six alliance partnerships with large pharmaceutical firms.
3For a case study see Bower and Whittaker (1993).
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ing or marketing resources, they also operate internal biotechnology functions. The situation was
different when the biotechnology market emerged in the mid-1970s. At that time there was a clear
dichotomy in the R&D focus of suppliers and buyers. On the supply side, a typical new biotech firm
used advances in cell and molecular biology for the design of a new therapeutic agent (e.g., a protein).
On the demand side, the established pharmaceutical firms, whose technological competence focused
on the random screening of compounds against disease targets, procured research in the market for
biotechnology before engaging in clinical development. Since then, the largest pharmaceutical firms
have acquired capabilities in molecular genetics and recombinant DNA technology (Galambos and
Sturchio, 1998), so that the dichotomy has eroded:
“[e]stablished firms have embraced biological approaches, including genomics, to drug
discovery, while ‘biotech firms’ employ chemistry” (Pisano, 2006; p. 17). In other words,
“[a]lthough the general trend toward increasingly outsourcing what was formerly in-
house research is there for all to see, a number of cases of the opposite philosophy, adding
in-house research where it previously didn’t exist, is also occasionally in evidence” (Ry-
dzewski, 2008; p. 56).
Outsourced R&D also relates to late-stage development activities. Once a new compound, or
a candidate vaccine, has been discovered, and tested in animal models, it must go through clinical
trials conducted on human subjects. These trials need to produce evidence of safety and efficacy, as
required for regulatory approval by government agencies (e.g., the FDA) before market introduction.
There are three phases that involve increasingly large samples of subjects from a few dozen (phase
1) to, in case of success, several hundred (phase 2), and then to several thousand subjects (phase 3).
Industry studies show persistent growth worldwide in the proportion of expenditures for clinical
trials outsourced to specialized contract research organizations (CROs), from 26% in 2003 to 38% in
2010 (Aldrich, 2012), for higher financial returns than in the case of early-stage activities.4 As in the
case of biotechs, a subcontractor of clinical trial services forms simultaneous contractual relationships
with several clients. In 2011, for example, Parexel entered into multi-year contractual agreements
4For example, business experts observe that “[t]he robust fundamental drivers fuelling CRO market growth and consol-
idation have, for a number of years, also attracted the attention of private equity investors and, more recently, the capital
markets. (...) Key features that make this growth segment of the healthcare industry particularly attractive to private in-
vestors seeking to realise high annual returns and exits within 3-5 years include: high visibility of revenues, excess cash
generation, strong balance sheets and limited exposure to a number of risks that commonly affect biopharma companies
(...)” (Bali, de Lima, and Yang, Results Healthcare, http://resultshealthcare.com.)
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with both Merck and Pfizer. The contracting firms do not restrict their strategies to either make or
buy clinical trial services as “[f]or a given study, sponsors can choose to retain some functions in
house while contracting out others” (Azoulay, 2004; p. 1594). By outsourcing the latter tasks the
firms attempt to benefit from economies of scale and scope (Macher and Boerner, 2006), and thereby
to reduce their clinical trial costs, which are estimated at around US$220 million for a new drug
(Mestre-Ferrandiz, Sussex, and Towse, 2012).5
In our model, the respective efforts of the external unit and its client firms are endogenous, so
that the vertical division of R&D activities can occur at any point between total outsourcing and full
integration. This formal specification is consistent with the observation that the collaboration of big
pharma firms with biotech units or clinical trial providers creates joint inputs across the two sides
of the contractual relationship, with an exact balance that might vary significantly on a case by case
basis.
At all stages of the R&D process, the demand side usually designs the contracts that organize a
technological relationship. This is explained by the fact that, when internal resources are available,
the capacity of established pharmaceutical firms to “go for it alone” – though possibly at a higher
cost – increases their bargaining power (Arora et al., 2004). Other factors include the severe financial
constraints faced by specialized biotech units (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Golec and Vernon, 2009), to-
gether with a high rate of entry on the supply side (Rothaermel, 2001; Argyres and Liebeskind, 2002)
while incumbents on the demand side remain highly concentrated. Although the latter structural
features describe a “buyer’s market”, we show that they cannot fully explain the persistently low
average profitability of biotech firms since the late 1970s (Pisano, 2006, 2010).6 Indeed, in the anal-
ysis that follows we identify circumstances where the external unit appropriates the total industry
profit, for any probability of R&D success, with client firms that behave as principals and are no less
informed than the common independent contractor.
Detailed studies of R&D agreements find that contracts incorporate complex clauses to fine tune
the financial mechanism (equity participation, milestone payments, licensing fees, ...) with the tech-
5The out-of-pocket cost of clinical testing depends on the number of patients required to collect sufficient data as de-
manded from regulatory agencies. It is even higher in the case of preventive vaccine candidates, as the size of human
subject test samples is often larger than for drugs (Scherer, 2011; Keith et al., 2013).
6Over the last years the average profitability of biotech companies has remained low: “Of the 286 biotech companies
trading on public exchanges today, 241 focus on drug development, a slight drop in numbers from last year. Of these 241
in the biopharmaceutical space, only 28 (12%) had both a product on the market and positive net income for FY 2012.”(D.
Thomas, Inside Bio Industry Analysis, http://www.biotech-now.org.)
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nology supplied (or not) by the external unit to other possible client firms. Non-compete clauses
delineate the know-how that the external unit may not use with a third party, except as expressly au-
thorized. Such clauses typically include a “right of first refusal” (Folta, 1998; Hagedoorn and Hesen,
2007) that allows a firm to purchase the rights – or only a selection – to the R&D outcomes of a biotech
supplier before such an option is offered to third parties. Other clauses introduce a “right to match of-
fer”, whereby the external unit commits contractually to notify the client firm of its intent to contract
with another party, and thereby to reveal the technological and financial terms of the competing offer
(e.g., the amount and timing of any milestone payments).7 Such clauses thus form a contractual link
between the payments received by the external unit from a client firm and the technology that can be
supplied to a competitor. Accordingly, in our model each firm can condition its payment scheme on
the verifiable operations that are conducted inside the external unit, including those that relate to a
third party. This assumption does not mean that a technology received from the external unit cannot
partly benefit a competitor. Unsolicited and non contractible technological spillovers, both through
the external unit and across firms, are introduced in the analysis.
A large proportion of theoretical analyses of R&D activities (see section 2) specify a research unit
that is more knowledgeable than its client firms8, or that can contract secretly with competitors.9
Although such situations of asymmetric information can also be spotted in the biopharmaceutical
industry, we choose to investigate a complementary approach where client firms, which can engage
in research and development operations, are not less competent than an external unit, and are not
threatened by some form of misbehavior. Uncertainty, in our model, is a risk of failure in technologi-
cal activities, as conducted externally or internally, or in downstream commercial operations, that is
faced by all parties, without assuming superior information on the supply side of the R&D market.
This approach is motivated by well-documented observations in science-based businesses:
7For example, non-compete clauses of this kind appear in contractual agreements between Merck and Tularik (dated
Dec. 22, 1996), and between Eli Lilly and the same biotech company (Sep. 24, 1999). The contracts are available at:
http://contracts.onecle.com/alpha
8In theoretical models of R&D with asymmetric information, the innovator, usually specified as an agent, is assumed to
be better informed than a firm, specified as a principal. Such an assumption captures circumstances where, for example,
a biotech has accumulated more knowledge on the value of a project than its downstream industrial partners. However,
in many other circumstances, pharma firms that conduct R&D operations internally can also be more informed on the
technological potential of a research program than a CRO that performs systematic tests on lead products candidates.
9Secret reselling is unlikely in the biopharmaceutical context, where biotech firms and clinical trial suppliers alike en-
hance their reputation by communicating on their contractual partners and on the content of agreements. Moreover, “the
identities of partners and descriptions of alliances figure prominently in biotechnology companies’ securities registration
statements” when an initial public offering is in preparation (Stuart et al., 1999, p. 327; see also Baum, Calabrese, Silverman,
2000), and government agencies scrutinize all the steps before possible market introduction and public authorization.
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“Uncertainty related to the success/failure of R&D activities is the major concern for R&D
managers in the biopharmaceutical industry. If the R&D activity is unsuccessful, indeed,
there is no product to commercialize.” (Pennings and Sereno, 2011; p. 375, added empha-
sis).
Our model specifications are consistent with early-stage (research) and phase 1 clinical trial (devel-
opment) activities, when the outcomes of operations are a priori uncertain to all parties.10 In any case,
for all drugs, vaccines, or biologics, contracting problems in later-stage alliances are also limited if
“contingencies can be readily specified and outcomes are subject to external validation” (Robinson
and Stuart, 2007; p. 7), for example when “the biotechnology researchers have to perform specifiable
experiments on a lead product candidate” (Lerner and Malmendier, 2010; p. 215).
Finally, big pharma firms also take part in the equity market to acquire external R&D units. Re-
cent examples include Merck taking control of Idenix (antiviral therapeutics) in 2014, AstraZeneca of
Acerta Pharma (oncology and autoimmune diseases) and AbbVie of Pharmacyclics (immune-related
disorders) in 2015. Acquisitions usually conclude a bidding contest where several big pharma rivals
vie for the same buyout target.11 Accordingly, in our model we assume that the firms’ owners can bid
for the control of the external unit, and assess the claim by industry experts that equity valuations
are often excessive.12
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature that
relates to our analysis. Section 3 describes our formal model. Section 4 examines the interplay of out-
sourced and internal endogenous R&D levels, and characterizes the distribution of profits. Section 5
investigates the incentives to shift to a more integrated industry structure. Section 6 concludes.
10The specification that an agent in charge of an innovation project with uncertain payoff has no superior information
before acting than its client firms can be seen as “a reasonable assumption if we are at the initial stages of a research
undertaking” (Holmstro¨m, 1989; p. 310).
11“For several days, Johnson & Johnson was considered the most likely acquirer of Pharmacyclics, and there were er-
roneous news reports on Wednesday before the markets closed that it had won the bidding. But AbbVie stepped in with
a higher bid ...” (www.nytimes.com, March 5, 2015); or “AstraZeneca Plc and Pfizer Inc. are among firms considering a
counteroffer for Medivation Inc., challenging Sanofi’s $9.3 billion bid for the company ...” (www.bloomberg.com, April 29,
2016)
12“AbbVie shares were down 3% in Thursday trading, as some investors and analysts expressed concern the company
was overpaying for Pharmacyclics, of Sunnyvale, Calif, which sells a drug called Imbruvica with partner Johnson & John-
son.” (www.wsj.com, May 5, 2015); and “GlaxoSmithKline CEO Andrew Witty questioned the ... valuations of recent
deals” ... and stated that “[s]ome of these valuations look stretched.” (www.firstwordpharma.com, May 11, 2015)
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2 The Related Literature
2.1 The Theory
In a pioneering paper, Aghion and Tirole (1994) formally analyze the relative efficiency of separating
or integrating an external research unit and a firm. The two entities have fully distinct roles, with
an exclusive division of R and (separately) D tasks. This setting describes complementary activities,
since only the external unit can produce an innovation, and only the firm can develop it into a mar-
ketable product.13 A contract specifies ex ante whether R and D tasks will occur under separation or
integration, the license fee received by the research unit, and the firm’s investment level. It is found
that separation – a case of research outsourcing – is more efficient (i.e., joint expected value is max-
imized) than integration when the marginal efficiency of the research unit’s effort is large enough
relative to the one of the firm’s investment. However, if the firm writes the contract, and the external
unit is financially constrained, then integration can be inefficiently retained in equilibrium, with no
value earned by the external unit.
In Anton and Yao (1994) the value of the new technology does not depend on the level of either R
(upstream) or D (downstream), so the focus is on profit distribution, not on efficiency. There are two
possible client firms, approached sequentially by the external research unit, and which can proceed
to the development stage before competing in a final market. Because there is no patent protection,
if the external unit discloses its discovery to one of the two firms, then that firm can imitate it at no
cost and appropriate all innovation benefits. However, a firm can choose not to imitate but instead
pay for the technology to incentivize the external unit not to contract subsequently with the other
firm. The main result is that provided the external unit’s ex ante wealth is sufficiently limited, it can
appropriate a share of the value of its discovery by first disclosing it to one of the two firms to get a
contract offer from that informed client, without transferring any knowledge to the other firm.
In our formal setting, both the value generated by technological operations and its distribution
among players are endogenous. As in Aghion and Tirole (1994), a firm can outsource research efforts
to an external unit and simultaneously invest in internal development operations, although it can
also possibly rely exclusively on internal resources, in which case all R&D activities are conducted
13In the terminology of Mowery (1983), complementarity here can be seen as “structural”, in that in-house and external
R&D operations are not substitutable by assumption.
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downstream. As in Anton and Yao (1994), the external unit can supply new technology to two client
firms that can benefit from (or be penalized by) knowledge externalities, although in our model the
two firms interact simultaneously in the market for technology.
Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006, 2013) combine some of the specifications of the seminal models
by Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Anton and Yao (1994). Again the output of the external research unit
is needed for innovation, along with the endogenous development efforts chosen non-cooperatively
by two client firms, who then compete in the final market. The external unit can decide to sell its
technology to one of the two firms, then secretly to the competitor. Although selling twice means
additional revenue, it also reduces the ex post final-market value to the first firm, and thereby induces
a lower payment from the latter to the research unit. Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006) concentrate on
the development choices of client firms (the R part of R&D is not considered). For a given level of the
external unit’s output, the parties can opt for two alternative licensing modes. In the “open” mode,
a patent describes the new technology, that the external unit can then license to one of the two firms
exclusively in exchange for a lump sum transfer, with some knowledge that leaks to the competitor.
In the “closed” mode, the external unit discloses the non-patented technology to one of the firms in
exchange for a share of final-market revenues, which must be sufficiently high for the external unit
not to resell secretly. The latter mode occurs more frequently, with no reselling to the competitor, if
the external unit’s output level is high and the technological leakage with patenting is substantial.
In Bhattacharya and Guriev (2013) the external unit chooses ex ante a non-verifiable research effort
that conditions the value of its technological output (the R part of R&D is thus reintroduced, with
no possible reallocation of the two types of activities). Then integration with one of the firms, plus
closed governance (no patenting, exclusive transfer to the acquirer, sharing of ex post revenues), can
result in a higher ex ante effort than separation.
Although we depart from the assumption that technology reselling is secret and not verifiable, we
share with Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006, 2013) the specification that industry efficiency depends
on endogenous choices by the external unit and/or two firms that also interact in a final market.
In another set of papers, R and D operations are not considered separately, but are viewed as a
single activity that is fully performed either by an external unit or, exclusively so, internally by a firm,
so the external and internal R&D activities are substitutable.
Both Lai, Riezman, and Wang (2009) and Ho (2009) assumed that a single client firm (a princi-
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pal) offers a contract to the external unit (an agent), although some technological information can
be leaked subsequently to a competitor, a decision that cannot be verified by a Court. In Lai, Riez-
man, and Wang (2009) the firm chooses a lump-sum amount plus a revenue percentage to be paid
in exchange for a specific cost-reducing technology. In the process some information on the firm’s
operating environment is learnt by the external unit, which can then decide to leak that knowledge in
secret to the firm’s competitor. When writing the contract, the firm trades-off between the benefit of
the external unit’s superior R&D efficiency and the revenue loss caused by the leakage. For some pa-
rameter values, the firm finds it profitable to externalize R&D with a lump-sum contract even though
this allows the leakage to occur.
In Ho (2009) the external unit can supply a cost-reducing technology with some non-zero prob-
ability by incurring a fixed cost. The outsourcing firm commits contractually to transfer a payment
that is a function of the reported success of the R&D process. Both the external unit’s decision to in-
vest and the result of its R&D effort (success/failure) are private information. After the external unit
accepts the contract and incurs the fixed cost, if successful then it can secretly offer the technology
to an ex ante symmetric final-market competitor of the principal, possibly for a higher total revenue,
before reporting the failure to the outsourcing firm. As a main result, any contract that incentivizes
the external unit not to leak the technology necessarily results in a lower net profit to the principal
than the status quo (no outsourcing).
R&D operations are also formalized as a single activity in Vencatachellum and Versaevel (2009),
but the model departs from the possible secret recontracting assumption, and the two firms simul-
taneously offer competing contracts to the external unit for the delivery of specific technological
services (a common agency situation). An observable “active” leakage occurs when the contracts
incentivize the external unit to serve both firms, together with a “passive” (unsolicited) leakage cap-
tured by an inter-firm spillover parameter. With positive economies of scope, but limited spillovers,
the two firms receive R&D and earn higher equilibrium profits than by relying on internal resources.
In Spulber (2013), complete information also excludes secret reselling in a very general two-stage
model where a set of competing external inventors (a multiproject monopoly inventor) engage in
uncertain R&D projects for a new production technology (a unit cost of production drawn indepen-
dently of other inventors from a given distribution). They compete in the market for technology to
sell their invention to a set of firms, which compete in a final market. After the R&D takes place
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upstream, the firms observe the inventions together with their respective inventors’ two-part roy-
alty offers, and simultaneously make adoption and product pricing decisions. In equilibrium, the
inventor with the most efficient process technology charges a combination of lump-sum and per-unit
royalties to the firms, which all adopt the technology. It is found that competitive entry of inven-
tors generates more R&D than a multiproject monopoly inventor, and that an increase in the number
of client firms (without free entry) and a lower downstream entry cost (when there is free entry)
both increase entry of competing inventors. When the downstream firms vertically integrate R&D
and production operations, and agree to share the best invention obtained from all projects before
competing in prices in the final market, the R&D activity is suboptimal.
Allain, Henry, and Kyle (2015) adopt another approach with separated R and D periods. An
external research unit, which generates new technology of uncertain value, faces a set of potential
client firms that compete in an auction for the exclusive benefit of the technology, and again possibly
interact in a final market. Consistently with the biopharmaceutical context (the theoretical model is
motivated by an empirical analysis with data collected in that industry), there is full patent protec-
tion, so that no secret technology transfer occurs. A development phase is needed to establish the
value of the innovation. The research unit can decide either to engage in it, at a given high cost, before
selling the new technology with known value, or to first sell the innovation before its value is known
and let a firm proceed to the development phase, at a lower cost, so the external and internal devel-
opment efforts are substitutable. When the research unit is ex ante more confident about the value
of the innovation than the firms, it chooses to develop it on its own for a higher expected benefit if
and only if its cost disadvantage is not too large. The latter situation is more likely if, following an
increase in the number of firms, the positive effect on the license fee resulting from the auction (more
bidders participate) dominates the negative effect on gross profits (more downstream competition).14
We share with the latter two recent papers the assumption that complete information (Spulber,
2013), or property rights (Allain et al., 2015), prevent secret reselling, together with the characteriza-
tion of the connection between the nature of competition among client firms and incentives to engage
in R&D operations. Our approach is complementary to both contributions, where the intensity of
downstream competition is driven by the number of client firms. In our model, the number of firms
14Allain et al. (2015) also construct a large dataset on exclusive licensing deals and investigate the drivers of the decision,
by a research unit that has discovered a drug candidate, to proceed also to development operations. They find an inverted
U-shaped relation between the number of potential licensees and the probability that a research unit engages in the later
phases of clinical trials before licensing, instead of leaving the whole development process to its licensee.
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on the demand side of the R&D market is constant, and the intensity of competition is a consequence
of the exact effects of external and internal R&D operations on cost and demand conditions. As in
Allain et al. (2015), in our model the intensity of competition among client firms drives the vertical
division of labor in R&D operations, and as in Spulber (2013) an appropriability problem may lead to
vertical integration of R&D and production. We also share with Ho (2009), Lai, Riezman, and Wang
(2009) and Vencatachellum and Versaevel (2009) the assumption that the firms write contract offers,
to which the external unit responds, and which can lead to multi-contracting. A key specific feature
of our model, consistently with the biopharmaceutical context, is that the firms, which also run inter-
nal research and/or development tasks, condition their payments on a measure of the external unit’s
operations, formalizing some kind of dialogue in the market for technology (so the external unit ’s
operations are not conducted before the client firms’ choice of payment schemes).
2.2 The Empirical Evidence
The endogeneity of the respective efforts of the external unit and its client firms, in our model, cap-
tures the observation that the distribution of tasks between a R&D supplier and its sponsors might
vary significantly on a case by case basis. Several empirical papers identify a number of factors that
cause this variation.
Arora and Gambardella (1990) use data on agreements that involve large chemical and/or phar-
maceutical producers. They establish that several types of linkages, including investments in the
capital stock of biotech companies and joint R&D with other producers, complement each other. In
a transaction costs approach, Pisano (1991) analyzes data on biotechnology projects that are either
the sole responsibility of an independent partner or fully conducted internally by a pharma firm.
Pisano finds that internal sourcing is more likely in the biotechnology product areas in which ex-
pertise is concentrated in fewer R&D suppliers. In an incomplete contracts perspective, Lerner and
Merges (1998) use a database of agreements between biotechnology suppliers and pharmaceutical
firms. They find support for the conjecture that the allocation of control rights to the R&D entity (e.g.,
right to manage clinical trials, to undertake process development, to terminate alliance, ...) increases
with its financial resources. The latter result justifies our specification that big pharma firms, which
have deeper pockets than biotechs units and CROs, are those that write contracts in the intermediate
market for R&D.
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Our formal approach of the circumstances in which contracted-out technology either stimulates
or reduces in-house operations connects also to other papers that characterize the interaction between
external and internal R&D activities in the biopharmaceutical industry. In an early contribution to
that literature, Arora and Gambardella (1994) use a sample of client firms in the biotech market, and
find support for the hypothesis that firms need internal know-how to evaluate alternative projects
and to use the technology more effectively. More recently, Belderbos, Kelchtermans and Leten (2010)
use panel data on the patenting and publication activities of large pharmaceutical firms and find that
the magnitude of the effect of external basic research exploitation is significantly greater if firms con-
duct more internal basic research. Hagedoorn and Wang (2012) also use a panel sample of incumbent
pharmaceutical firms, with the innovative output (the dependent variable) measured as the number
of annual biotechnology patents granted to these firms. They find that the level of internal R&D ex-
penditure drives the interactive effect between external and internal R&D strategies. Above (below) a
threshold level of internal R&D investments, the marginal returns to internal R&D are higher (lower)
when new technology is sourced externally through alliances or acquisitions, which indicates com-
plementarity (substitutability). An ambiguous conclusion is also reached by Ceccagnoli, Higgins,
and Palermo (2014), who use another panel dataset from the biopharmaceutical industry to estimate
the partial cross-derivative of an innovation production function (the output is the yearly stock of
compounds in a firm’s pipeline) with respect to external (in-licensing) and internal R&D expendi-
ture. Their results suggest that external and internal R&D are neither complements nor substitutes,
and that complementarity increases with a few drivers (e.g., prior licensing experience). Our first
formal proposition, in Section 3, accords with these empirical results.
Papers such as Veugelers (1997), Veugelers and Cassiman (1999, 2005), and Cassiman and Veugel-
ers (2006) find similar results by using cross-sectional data on R&D active firms. In the latter papers
the complementarity between external and internal sources of technology is context related. Specif-
ically, the strength of the complementarity between innovation activities increases with the reliance
on basic R&D, as measured by the use of universities and research institutes as information sources.
With panel data distributed over several manufacturing industries, Lokshin, Belderbos, and Carree
(2008) examine the impact of external and internal technology sourcing on labor productivity. They
find that higher values of internal R&D intensity allow firms to benefit most from more external R&D.
Another set of papers use data collected at the firm level and at the level of individual R&D
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projects in order to distinguish between economies of scale and economies of scope in the production
of intellectual property. The evidence depends on the nature of technological activities. Henderson
and Cockburn (1996), Cockburn and Henderson (2001), and Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen
(2013) find economies of scope and significant knowledge spillovers in early-stage drug “discovery”
tasks (those on with biotech units typically focus). However, Danzon, Nicholson, and Sousa Pereira
(2005), and Macher and Boerner (2006), identify diseconomies of scope and nonexistent spillovers
in the late-phase clinical trials of candidate medicines (the “development” activities that are usually
outsourced to specialized CROs). Two of our theoretical propositions, in Section 4, clearly echo these
contrasted empirical results, and show their relevance for explaining the distribution of industry
profits between an external unit and its client firms.
A few other recent papers point to the ability of client firms, in the biopharmaceutical industry, to
contractually control the behavior of external technology suppliers. Robinson and Stuart (2007) study
the features of early-stage (discovery) research contractual agreements, in which large firms sponsor
small biotech companies. They notably find that partners choose to contract for actions that might be
costly, or even impossible, to verify. A suggested interpretation is that a client firm can obtain broader
termination rights when provisions on unverifiable research decisions are included in a contract, and
thus enhance the ex ante incentives of the external research unit to uphold the contract. Higgins
(2007) analyzes R&D alliances between a firm and a biotech company. There is a milestone payment
structure in 90 percent of the contracts. Because they condition further financing on clearly identified
objectives, milestone payments protect the client firm from misbehavior. Lerner and Malmendier
(2010) examine agreements that involve a biotech firm as an R&D provider. Termination rights are
assigned to the financing firm in 96 percent of the contracts, and can be coupled with the reversion
to the same firm of all intellectual property rights as generated through the contractual relationship.
Termination rights thus incentivize the subcontractor to remain focused on the objectives specified
in the agreement, and our model specifications are consistent with this conclusion.15
Another set of papers focuses on the drivers or implications of mergers and acquisitions in the
pharma industry. By using a sample of transactions that each involve a target biotech firm, Folta
(1998) finds support for the hypothesis that contractual agreements are used to defer acquisition of a
15In a model that precedes their empirical analysis, Lerner and Malmendier (2010) show that if the R&D supplier is not
financially constrained, the termination rights coupled with transfer payments can result in the same outcome as a simple
complete contract.
16
target R&D supplier and economize on the cost of committing resources to a technology with uncer-
tain value. Our choice to study first the profit distribution in a decentralized setting, before character-
izing incentives to integrate in the R&D market, is thus compatible with industry practice. Higgins
and Rodriguez (2006) examine the performance of acquisitions by established pharmaceutical firms
of smaller competitors and/or biotech units to understand the effect of R&D outsourcing acquisitions
on an individual firm’s R&D productivity. In their analysis, each acquiring firm had been involved,
on average, in four contractual relationships with the target prior to the acquisition. They notably
find that acquisitions supplement a firm’s internal R&D efforts, and that firms with greater R&D in-
tensity are more likely to engage in acquisitions. Danzon, Epstein, and Nicholson (2007) examine the
determinants and effects of a sample of operations that include the purchase by pharmaceutical firms
of an equity stake in biotech firms. They find in particular that financially strong firms are less likely
to be part of an acquisition, either as a target or as an acquirer. We use these findings to comment our
results in Section 5.
3 The Model
In this section we draw on the industry characteristics described above to construct a formal model.
There are two related research and development (R&D) stages in an intermediate market for tech-
nology, and a final product market. Upstream, a for-profit independent unit (hereafter, “the lab”)
supplies new technology.16 Downstream, two firms can outsource R&D to the lab, and/or conduct
in-house R&D operations, before competing in the final market, where they supply substitutable
(possibly imperfectly so) goods.
Profit functions — The non-negative external R&D levels, as chosen by the lab specifically for each
firm, are described by x .= (x1, x2). The internal R&D levels, as chosen by the two firms, are described
by y .= (y1, y2). The final-market strategies are denoted by z
.
= (z1, z2).17
The lab’s net profit is
v0(x)
.
= t1(x) + t2(x)− f0(x), (1)
16Here we describe R&D as an output, that is as a service or technology delivered to clients. However it can also be con-
sidered as an input, that is as a pecuniary investment level chosen by the lab. Formal examples of the two interpretations
are given in Section 4.
17The argument z can represent prices or quantities, indifferently, or refer to more elaborate competitive interactions.
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where f0 is the lab’s cost, and ti is firm i’s transfer payment, both functions of x. In line with the
stylized facts described in introduction (section 1.2), the latter transfer function formalizes the fine
tuning of firms’ payments with the verifiable operations inside the external unit, as made possible by
complex non-compete contractual clauses.18





xi + yi, xj, yj, z
)− fi (yi)− ti(x), (2)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, where fi is the firm-specific cost of sourcing yi internally, and gi is a gross profit
function.19 In the latter function, firm i’s external and internal R&D levels xi and yi are added as an
argument, which formalizes the assumption that external R&D tasks can also be performed inside
the firm. The competitor’s variables xj and yj are arguments of the same function, allowing for
technological spillovers. The gross profit also depends on final-market non-cooperative strategies, z.
Timing — There are four stages, as follows:
(i) The two firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose a transfer function ti(x) ≥ 0,
i = 1, 2, that they offer to the lab.
(ii) The lab accepts either both contractual offers simultaneously, or only one, or none, and
chooses the firm-specific R&D levels in x that maximize v0(x).
At this stage the lab refuses all contracts if they imply lower benefits than the reservation value
v0 = 0, and it takes only one of the two offers if this implies higher benefits than accepting the two





{tj (x)− f0 (x)}
}
, (3)
for some x ≥ (0, 0), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. As the firms’ payments cannot be negative, in equilibrium the
18Our common agency model is thus of the public kind (Martimort, 2006). This specification differs from most papers
that focus on consumer goods markets, where less sophisticated non-compete clauses, hardly verifiable activities, and
various antitrust regulations can justify the assumption that a principal can contract exclusively on what it specifically
receives from the agent, with no possible connection between payments and the other activities of the agent that benefit a
competitor (e.g., Martimort and Stole, 2003).
19The form of net profit functions is similar to that considered by Cre´mer and Riordan (1987) for the modelling of
multilateral transactions with bilateral contracts, but with transfer payments that are here contingent on the lab’s possible
choice of R&D levels.
20As the lab (an agent) can choose to accept only a subset of contracts offered by the two firms (principals), this is a
“delegated common agency” model in the terminology introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986a).
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participation constraints in (3) are always exactly satisfied.21 This however does not imply that the
equilibrium R&D levels and transfer functions are symmetric, nor that payments are both positive. It
can be the case that firm i offers a “null” contract, where ti (x) = 0, all x, and still receives technology.
This occurs for example if limiting inter-firm technological spillovers is prohibitively costly for the
lab.
(iii) The firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their own internal R&D level yi ≥ 0.
(iv) The firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their final-market strategy zi ≥ 0.
Information — The two firms (principals) know the strategies available to the other players and the
related payoffs. This specification does not apply to the lab (an agent), which needs not know the
downstream cost and demand conditions. In case of non-deterministic R&D outcomes (see examples
2 and 3 in the next section), the contracts are written ex ante, that is before the lab tests technological
options, so it has no superior understanding of the stochastic project returns than the client firms
(see section 1.2 on the biopharmaceutical industry context). Information is verifiable by an external
enforcer, so that all parties are committed to their contracts.22
Equilibrium concept — The results presented in the next section refer to reduced-form expressions
of the payoff functions introduced in (2). For any (x, y), henceforth we assume that there exists a
unique final-market Nash equilibrium z∗(x, y), so that we may introduce gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
) .
= gi(xi +
yi, xj, yj, z∗(x, y)), firm i’s reduced-form gross profit.23 For any x, we also assume that there exists
a unique internal R&D stage Nash equilibrium y∗(x), which allows for the introduction of g˜i (x)
.
=
gˆi(xi + y∗i (x), xj, y
∗
j (x)) − fi (y∗i (x)), firm i’s profit net of internal R&D costs. Finally, for any given




The following definitions are needed before introducing the solution concept: (1) for any x ∈
X(ti, tj) and x′ ∈ X(t′i, tj), firm i’s transfer function ti is a best response to the other firm’s tj if g˜i (x)−
21Should in equilibrium the for-profit lab contract exclusively with, say, firm 1, to deliver x˜ ∈ arg maxx{t1 (x)− f0 (x)},
for any t2 (x˜) > (=)0 it would earn t1 (x˜)− f0 (x˜) < (=) t1 (x˜) + t2 (x˜)− f0 (x˜), a contradiction, so (3) is satisfied. More-
over, should the lab supply xˆ to earn t1 (xˆ) + t2 (xˆ)− f0 (xˆ) > t1 (x˜)− f0 (x˜), then firm 2 would find it profitable to reduce
its transfer to t′2 (xˆ) = t2 (xˆ)− ϕ, where ϕ
.
= (t1 (xˆ) + t2 (xˆ)− f0 (xˆ))− (t1 (x˜)− f0 (x˜)), for (3) to hold with equality.
22R&D contracts usually include provisions for dispute resolution and point to an external private arbitrager, or to a
specific Court, in case of litigation (e.g., Robinson and Stuart, 2007).
23Here we follow Amir et al. (2003) by interpreting the reduced-form gross profit function gˆi as the overall payoff of an
infinite-horizon multi-stage game in the product market. Then R&D choices can be seen as long-term decisions, followed
by a series of short-term final-market decisions.
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ti(x) ≥ g˜i (x′)− t′i(x′), all t′i; (2) the transfer function ti is truthful relative to x˜ if ti(x) .= sup{0, g˜i(x)−
[g˜i (x˜)− ti(x˜)]}.24
The solution concept is the truthful subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (TSPNE). The four-tuple
(t˜, x˜, y˜, z˜) is a TSPNE if, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i : (i) z˜ = z∗(x˜, y˜); (ii) y˜ = y∗(x˜); (iii) x˜ ∈ X(t˜); (iv) t˜i is a
best response to t˜j; and (v) t˜i is truthful relative to x˜. It follows that t˜i(x) = sup{0, g˜i(x)− v∗i }, where
the constant v∗i
.
= g˜i(x˜)− t˜i(x˜) is firm i’s equilibrium payoff.
Truthfulness is a standard refinement in delegated common agency games. There are two prop-
erties that offer a strong justification for using it (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986b; Laussel and Le
Breton, 2001; Martimort, 2007). A first property is that for any set of transfer offers by any of the
two firms, there exists a truthful strategy in the other firm’s best-response correspondence. A firm
can thus restrict itself to truthful strategies. A second property is that all truthful Nash equilibria are
coalition-proof. Therefore, the two firms’ joint net profits in a TSPNE are not lower than in any other
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.25
Technological assumptions — Each firm’s gross profit function is (weakly) increasing in its own R&D
levels, as received from the lab or sourced internally (formally ∂gˆi/∂si ≥ 0 where si .= xi + yi, i = 1, 2).
However gˆi can be decreasing, or not, in the rival’s arguments, xj and yj. In any case a firm’s gross
profit is (weakly) more impacted by its own R&D, as either purchased from the lab or produced












i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. The vertical comparison of the terms on the RHS of the inequality sign in (4) and
(5) specifies that the R&D leaks emanating from the lab are more informative than the technological
24When the gross profits g˜i (x) exceed v˜i(x˜), the difference between the transfer proposals ti(x) and ti (x˜) is equal to the
difference between g˜i (x) and g˜i (x˜); otherwise the transfer ti(x) is set to zero. On its positive part, a truthful contractual
offer thus exactly reflects firm i’s valuation of x relative to x˜.
25A Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof if it is robust to credible threats of deviations by any subset of principals (for
a formal definition see Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987). With two principals only, a coalition-proof equilibrium is
Pareto-efficient among principals (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986b). For a discussion on truthfulness as an equilibrium
refinement, see Martimort (2007).
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spillovers received from the competitor’s internal facilities.26
For both firms, returns to R&D can be either non-increasing (that is, ∂2 gˆi/∂s2i ≤ 0, i = 1, 2), or in-
creasing. The sign of all partial cross-derivatives can also be either non-positive (that is, ∂2 gˆi/∂xi∂xj ≤
0, ∂2 gˆi/∂xi∂yj ≤ 0, ∂2 gˆi/∂yi∂xj ≤ 0, and ∂2 gˆi/∂yi∂yj ≤ 0, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i), or positive. In all cases, the
second-order impact of a firm’s R&D, either produced in-house or received from the lab, on its own
marginal gross profit, is higher than the second-order effect of its competitor’s R&D:
∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂yi∂xi
∥∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂yi∂xj
∥∥∥∥ , (6)
= ≤∥∥∥∥∂2 gˆi∂y2i
∥∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂yi∂yj
∥∥∥∥ , (7)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. Again, the vertical comparison of cross-derivatives in (6) and (7) indicates that each
firm’s marginal gross profit is more impacted by the technological leakages that emanate from the
lab than from its competitor.
These technological assumptions are very mild and encompass many possible specifications of
gross profit and cost functions as introduced in the literature (we illustrate with examples of specific
algebraic forms in the next section).
Standalone values — The lab can guarantee for itself the value v0 = 0 (a normalization). As for the
firms, in order to define their outside option, suppose that j has exclusive access to the lab, implying
that firm i can rely only on internal resources, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. Then the contractual relationship
between the lab and firm j results in x∗j ∈ arg maxx[g˜j (x)− f0(x)], and firm i can guarantee for itself
the standalone value vi
.




= (x∗i , x
∗
j ), with x
∗
i ≥ 0, so firm i can possibly receive
technology, without financial compensation, in spite of firm j’s exclusive relationship with the lab.
For an equilibrium to exist it must be the case that v∗i ≥ vi, for both firms.
26In the words of Lai, Riezman, and Wang (2009), “information leakage is much more severe in the absence of internal
controls when R&D is outsourced” (p. 487).
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4 Technological Conditions and Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we investigate the circumstances in which technology outsourcing either stimulates
or reduces internal R&D levels, before deriving conditions for the lab to appropriate a share of R&D
profits, or to exactly break-even to the benefit of the outsourcing firms.
As a first result, we find that each firm’s equilibrium internal R&D level y∗i is monotonic in the
level xi received from the lab. The sign of the relation between y∗i and xi depends on the direction of
R&D returns, but not on technological spillovers.
Proposition 1 (external/internal R&D) The equilibrium level of a firm’s internal R&D activity y∗i is de-
creasing in the contracted external lab’s activity xi if and only if the gross profit functions gˆi have decreasing
returns in (xi, yi). More formally, for si
.







A first message in this proposition is that whether contracted-out R&D reduces or raises inter-
nal activity does not depend on inter-firm technological spillovers, because the second-order effect
in (8) bears only on each firm i’s own argument si, not on xj or yj, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. This property
contrasts with the well-known lesson received from many papers that adopt the analytical frame-
work of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) in order to focus on horizontal technological interactions.
In these papers, the strategic substitutability or complementarity of the firms’ technological choice
variables depends entirely on whether a spillover parameter is low or high, respectively. In our
model, the firms also interact vertically by competing in their contractual offers to the external unit.
This vertical interaction appears to dominate the horizontal effects for what regards the substitutabil-
ity/complementarity outcome.
Another message in Proposition 1 is that the relationship between external sourcing and internal
R&D activity is formally ambiguous. This ambiguity is structural, in that it depends on the func-
tional form of firms’ gross profit. Here contracted-out R&D reduces internal activity if and only if
there are decreasing returns to the introduction of cost-reducing or demand-enhancing technology in





= 0 if and only if either (i) ∂
2 gˆi
∂s2i
















where i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i (see Appendix A.2).
22
indicate a context-specific relationship between external and internal R&D sources in the biopharma-
ceutical industry. In Hagedoorn and Wang (2012) the estimated sign of the marginal effect of internal
R&D expenditure on the innovative output is negative, with the marginal returns to internal R&D
being possibly lower (higher) than when technology is sourced externally, reflecting a case of substi-
tutability (complementarity). In Ceccagnoli, Higgins, and Palermo (2014), the estimated sign of the
partial cross-derivative of an innovation production function with respect to external and internal
R&D expenditure is found to depend on a series of factors. These empirical investigations and our
formal characterization share the conclusion that external and internal R&D are neither complements
not substitutes per se, and are rather context related, as captured here by the sign of a second-order
effect.
In what follows we build on Proposition 1 by first considering separately situations of non-
increasing returns (∂2 gˆi/∂s2i ≤ 0), before discussing the robustness of our results when we shift
to non-decreasing returns (∂2 gˆi/∂s2i ≥ 0). In the two cases, to characterize the distribution of R&D
profits among the intermediate R&D market participants, we need defining as a value function the
highest joint profit for the lab together with any subset of firms, that is








where S ∈ {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}}. We assume that v(∅) = v0 = 0, which describes the no contract
situation, and that v ({i}) ≥ vi, implying that firm i’s exclusive control of the lab dominates its
standalone value, i = 1, 2.
The value function v(.) in (9) is instrumental for the caracterization of equilibrium outcomes in
the intermediate market for technology, as it captures the interplay of indirect and direct techno-
logical externalities: there are indirect technological externalities if the lab’s cost f0 of conducting
firm-specific R&D tasks is characterized by economies or diseconomies of scope; there are direct ex-
ternalities if the R&D received or generated by firm i enters in the gross profit function gˆj of its com-
petitor, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.28 Indirect (through the lab) and direct (inter-firm) technological externalities
can differ in magnitude and in sign, and an aggregate measure of the two categories of externalities is
28In (9), recall that g˜i (x)
.






, so that firm i’s profit does not depend only on xj, but
also on yj.
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given by the structural parameter
e
.
= v ({1, 2})− v ({1})− v ({2}) . (10)
If e < 0, that is v(.) is strictly subadditive, the maximization in x of joint profits generates less
value than the sum of individual profits as obtained by each firm when it exclusively controls the
lab, a situation where negative externalities dominate. Otherwise v(.) is superadditive, and positive
externalities (weakly) dominate.
Hereafter we denote the maximum industry profit v ({1, 2}) by Λ, for conciseness.




i = 1, 2. Simple sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model can now be derived for the joint
R&D benefits in equilibrium to be either fully appropriated by the two firms, or partly retained by
the lab. These conditions bear on the sign of indirect and direct R&D externalities, hence on the lab’s
costs f0 (x) and the firms’ reduced-form gross profit functions gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
)
, respectively.
Non-negative R&D externalities. Suppose, as a first case, that indirect and direct R&D externalities









Proposition 2 (non-negative R&D externalities) Conditions (12-13) imply that e ≥ 0. In all TSPNE
there exists a continuum of firm payoffs (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ≥ (v1, v2) that verify
v∗1 + v
∗
2 = Λ, (14)
and the lab exactly breaks even, that is
v∗0 = 0. (15)
24
In (12) the non-positive sign of the cross-derivatives of f0 in the dimensions of x describes economies
of scope in the production of R&D inside the external lab. Selecting a higher xi, as demanded by firm
i, makes it less costly for the lab to satisfy firm j.29 This condition is consistent with empirical in-
vestigations that evidence the presence of economies of scope in drug discovery (Henderson and
Cockburn, 1996) and clinical trials (Cockburn and Henderson, 2001).
For an interpretation of the conditions in (13), recall from the structure of each firm’s gross profit
function in (2) that R&D decisions generate not only technological (or knowledge) spillovers (xj and
yj are arguments of gi, j 6= i) but also a product-market rivalry effect (firm j’s external and internal
R&D impacts firm i’s strategy zi, j 6= i). As the two non-negative derivatives in (13) relate to the
reduced-form gˆi of the gross profit expression, they capture situations where technological spillovers
dominate the negative business stealing effect. This specification points to situations of substantial
spillovers, as observed by Henderson (1994) and Henderson and Cockburn (1996) between pharma-
ceutical firms. It is also consistent with Bloom et al. (2013) where significant technological spillovers,
and business stealing effects, are found in the pharma industry, together with strategic complemen-
tarity in R&D (e.g., the latter property applies in Example 4 below, case β ≥ 1/2).
Non-negative indirect and direct externalities reflect circumstances of weak technological rivalry
among the two firms, both in their contractual offers to the lab and in their internal operations, imply-
ing a limited ability of the external lab to appropriate R&D benefits. This theoretical characterization
is consistent with the empirical observation that the average profitability of biotech units is persis-
tently low. Proposition 2 actually establishes that the two firms appropriate all industry profits, and
the lab exactly breaks even.30 Therefore:
Corollary 1 When conditions (12-13) hold, incentives to invest in the external unit are delinked from the
value generated to the exclusive benefit of downstream sponsors.
The following example illustrates Proposition 2 with specific cost and demand functional forms
borrowed from the R&D literature.













, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, where S is the number of identical consumers,
29As Pisano (2006) puts it, “knowledge and capabilities accumulated in the pursuit of one therapeutic area can often be
leveraged to others” (p. 101).
30In Appendix A.4 we show that there always exists v∗i ≥ vi, i = 1, 2, such that the pair (v∗1 , v∗2) verifies (14). The
continuum of equilibrium payoffs is thus well defined.
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σ ∈ (0, 2) captures horizontal product differentiation, and ui measures firm i’s product quality, which depends




)1/4, where ε > 0 is an inverse cost measure, β ∈ [0, 1] is an
inter-firm technological parameter, si
.
= xi + yi and sj
.
= xj + yj.31 If x1 = x2 = 0 we have the original model,
otherwise external R&D contributes to innovation. We set S = σ = ε = 1, β = 1/2, and production costs
to zero for simplicity, and solve for the firms’ market stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities q∗1(x, y) and
q∗2(x, y). Inserting the latter expressions in gi
(













< 0 (decreasing returns) for all si > 0, so that from Proposition 1 we have
dy∗i
dxi
< 0 (contracted-out R&D
reduces internal activity). Moreover ∂gˆi∂xj > 0 and
∂gˆi
∂yj
> 0 (positive direct externalities) for all xi, xj > 0, so
that (13) is satisfied.32 Then any additive cost function for the external lab, e.g. f0 (x) = x1 + x2, satisfies
(12), so that Proposition 2 applies, so that the client firms fully appropriate R&D benefits. 
Negative R&D externalities. Suppose now that indirect and direct R&D externalities are negative,









Proposition 3 (negative R&D externalities) Conditions (16-17) imply that e < 0. In all TSPNE there is
a unique pair of firm payoffs (v∗1 , v
∗
2) that verify
v∗i = v({i})− |e| ≥ vi, (18)
i = 1, 2, and the lab appropriates a share of industry profits
v∗0 = |e| > 0. (19)
The condition on f0 in (16) formalizes a case of congestion, or diseconomies of scale, in the pro-
duction of R&D by the external lab. Supplying more R&D to a given firm makes it more costly to
serve the other firm. The conditions on gˆi in (17) describe circumstances in which more of firm j’s
R&D, as sourced externally or produced internally, weakly reduces firm i’s reduced-form gross profit,
all other things remaining equal. Together, these formal conditions relate to real-world circumstances
that strongly differ from the ones captured by conditions (12− 13). Unlike the empirical evidence
mentioned in the previous section on early-stage discovery activities that involve biotech entities,
31This functional form is adapted from Motta (1992).
32The expressions of derivatives are omitted for space limitation. They are available from the authors on request.
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diseconomies of scope (Macher and Boerner, 2006) and nonexistent technological spillovers (Danzon
et al. 2005; Macher and Boerner, 2006) have been found in later-stage development activities, notably
in phase 2 and phase 3 clinical trials, which involve CROs. The formal conditions in (16) and (17)
clearly point to these development activities.
In such cases of negative indirect and direct externalities, the client firms compete for the con-
trol of the lab’s operations in the intermediate R&D market, and are also penalized by the in-house
activity of their competitor. These circumstances are favorable to the lab. Proposition 3 establishes
that negative externalities fully drive the distribution of R&D benefits. Unlike the payoff in the pre-
vious section, the lab here appropriates a positive share of industry profits, in direct proportion to |e|
which is positive. Each firm’s payoff is equal to v({i}), i = 1, 2, as would be earned by controlling
the lab exclusively, truncated by |e|. The latter payoff can be shown to be greater that the standalone
value vi.33 The theoretical outcome that the external unit extracts a positive share is consistent with
the observation that CROs involved in clinical trials, unlike biotech units, on average earn superior
average financial returns.
Although stated in terms of cross-derivatives, the condition in (16) can be rewritten in discrete
form as f0(x ∧ x′) + f0(x ∨ x′)− f0(x)− f0(x′) ≥ 0, all x, x′ ∈ X, with a strict inequality whenever
x and x′ cannot be compared with respect to ≥ (strict supermodularity). The condition in (17) can
also be rewritten as gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
) ≥ gˆi(xi + yi, x′j, y′j) for all (x′j, y′j) ≥ (xj, yj). Differentiability is
adopted for notational convenience, but is not required, as illustrated by the next example.34
Example 2  Assume that x, y ∈ {0, 1}2, so the decision to invest in a cost-reducing program implies a
lump-sum expenditure. The lab’s R&D costs are f0(x) = 0 if x1 = x2 = 0, f0(x) = 1 if x1 + x2 = 1, and
f0(x) = +∞ otherwise, so that the discrete form of condition (16) is satisfied. Here anti-complementarities
imply that the lab serves at most one firm profitably (x1 = x2 = 1 is excluded).35 Firm i’s internal R&D costs
are fi(yi) = γyi, with γ ≥ 1 capturing a relative inefficiency vis-a`-vis the lab. The unit cost of production
is a positive constant ci(xi + yi), with ci(0) = cH and 0 ≤ ci(1) = ci(2) = cL < cH. The two firms sell a
homogeneous good, with total demand q = sup{0, a− p}, with p ≥ 0 and a > cH. Given (x, y), defining
pi
.
= (cH − cL) (a− cH), and solving for Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices, leads to gˆi(xi + yi, xj, yj) = pi >
33See Appendix A.4). From (10) the payoff to the lab can be rewritten as firm i’s marginal contribution to industry profit,
that is v∗i = Λ− v({j}), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
34In Appendix A.4 the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 are written for any f0 which is either weakly submodular or strictly
supermodular, respectively.
35The cost specification in this example, with f0 strictly supermodular, is borrowed from Laussel and Le Breton (2001).
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0 if xi + yi ≥ 1 and xj + yj = 0, and gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
)
= 0 otherwise, so the discrete form of condition (17) is
also satisfied. We assume that internal R&D is worth undertaking, that is γ/pi < 1. To compute equilibrium
payoffs, we consider the following two cases: (1) If the lab is inactive (x1 = x2 = 0), there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies (α∗i , α
∗
j ) of internal R&D investments, verifying
















which leads to the payoff vi(α∗1 , α
∗
2) = vi = 0, i = 1, 2.
37 So the firms are willing to transact with the
lab. (2) When the lab is active, from the assumption on f0 only one firm is served (xi = 1 > xj = 0),
and no firm invests in internal R&D since gˆi(1 + 1, 0, yj) − fi(1) < gˆi(1 + 0, 0, yj) − fi(0), all yj, and
gˆj(0+ 1, 1, yi)− f j(1) < gˆj(0+ 0, 1, yi)− f j(0), all yi. Therefore, industry value is v ({1, 2}) = v ({1}) =
v ({2}), so that v∗0 = v ({1, 2}) = pi − 1, and v∗i = v ({1, 2})− v ({j}) = 0, from Proposition 3. Firms’
interests are so antagonistic in this example as to make the lab fully appropriate industry value. 
Although the examples above describe a deterministic environment, the structural conditions in
Propositions 2 and 3 also capture circumstances in which R&D outcomes are uncertain for all parties.
To see that, consider the same specifications as in Example 2, but with the lab and the firms
being successful in R&D with probability ρ. Here it can be useful for a firm to invest simultaneously
with the lab to increase the probability of success. The unit cost of production c (xi + yi) is now
c (0) = cH with certainty, ci (1) = cL with probability ρ and ci (1) = cH with probability 1 − ρ,
and ci (2) = cL with probability 1 − (1− ρ)2 and ci (2) = cH with probability (1− ρ)2. Here the
distribution of (un)favorable events is common knowledge ex ante, and the true state is discovered
only through the realization of R&D tasks. Condition (16) remains unchanged, and although the
process is now uncertain, condition (17) also remains valid in expectation, as the choice of firm j
to attempt to innovate always reduces firm i’s expected profit. Thus Proposition 3 still holds. We
36Given that in this example firms are assumed to be symmetric, we leave aside the two asymmetric equilibria in pure
strategies (y∗1 = 0, y∗2 = 1) and (y∗1 = 1, y∗2 = 0).
37In this example, when firm i does not participate in the R&D market, its rival j receives technology from the relatively
more efficient lab (so x∗j = 1), exclusively so (x
∗
i = 0), and finds it profitable not to operate internally (y
∗
j = 0). Then in
this Bertrand context firm i maximizes profits by not investing in internal R&D, and its standalone value is vi = gˆi(0 +
y∗i , 1, 0)− fi(y∗i ) = gˆi(0+ 0, 1, 0)− fi(0) = 0, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
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assume as above that R&D is worth undertaking, even internally, that is γ/(ρpi) < 1. Provided that
the probability of success ρ remains sufficiently close to 1 so that 1− ρ < γ/ (ρpi), again a firm will
not engage in R&D if its rival receives technology from the lab or sources it internally, and we can
directly generalise the baseline example: (1) If the lab is inactive (x1 = x2 = 0), there exists a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies










for a payoff which again is the same as the standalone value vi (ρ) = 0, i = 1, 2, so the firms have an
incentive to transact with the lab. (2) When the lab is active, again from the assumption on f0 only one
firm is served (xi = 1 > xj = 0), and limited uncertainty does not modify the outcome that no firm
invests internally since, rewritting payoff functions in expected terms, Eρ
[




gˆi(1+ 0, 0, yj)
]− fi(0), all yj, and Eρ [gˆj(0+ 1, 1, yi)]− f j(1) < Eρ [gˆj(0+ 0, 1, yi)]− f j(0), all yi.
The payoff of the firm that does not receive external R&D is nil, so that v ({1, 2}) = v ({1}) = v ({2}).
Then v∗0 = v ({1, 2}), and v∗i = v ({1, 2})− v ({j}) = 0, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, from Proposition 3.
With these specifications, the lab is granted the (positive) expected industry profit, here equal to
ρpi− 1, while the firm that benefits from the lab’s output exactly breaks even only in expectation, and
its rival earns its standalone value for sure.
In the next example, we show that our results also apply to the polar situation with highly un-
certain R&D. We obtain that, when the competitor or its external contractor might fail with a high
probability, it can be a dominant strategy for the firms to engage in R&D as well.
Example 3 Consider the specifications of Example 2 with the extension to uncertain R&D considered above,
and focus on the case of rare succesful outcomes. It is assumed that R&D can be profitable, that is γ/(ρpi) < 1,
although the probability of success ρ is sufficiently close to 0 for γ/ (ρpi) < (1− ρ)2 to hold. In this case, the
likelihood that the competitor and the lab succeed in R&D is so low as to make the probability of simultaneous
success negligible. This implies that everything happens as if, when deciding to engage or not in R&D, each
firm were focusing on its own probability of success only, abstracting from the other players’ actions. Investing
in internal R&D is a dominant strategy: (1) If the lab is inactive (x1 = x2 = 0), the firms’ expected payoff
is (1− ρ)ρpi − γ, which is slightly higher than the standalone level vi (ρ) = (1− ρ)2ρpi − γ, i = 1, 2. (2)
When the lab is active, again the form of f0 implies that only one firm is served (xi = 1 > xj = 0). Still the
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distinctive feature here, in comparison to the previous example, is that both firms choose to invest internally as
well: Eρ
[
gˆi(1+ 1, 0, yj)
]− fi(1) > Eρ [gˆi(1+ 0, 0, yj)]− fi(0), all yj, and Eρ [gˆj(0+ 1, 1, yi)]− f j(1) >
Eρ
[
gˆj(0+ 0, 1, yi)
]− f j(0), all yi. Thus v ({i}) = [1− (1− ρ)2] (1− ρ)pi−γ− 1 (i.e., pi is earned by firm
i when the latter player and the lab do not both fail while firm j fails) and the industry expected value is now
v ({1, 2}) = (3− 2ρ)(1− ρ)ρpi− 2γ− 1 (the sum of firm i’s expected gross payoff [1− (1− ρ)2] (1− ρ)pi
and of firm j’s gross payoff (1− ρ)2ρpi net of total R&D costs). Therefore, from Proposition 3 we have v∗0 =
(1− ρ) ρpi − 1 > 0, and v∗i = v ({1, 2})− v ({j}) = (1− ρ)2 ρpi − γ, which is positive but remains equal
to the firms’ standalone level, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. By competing for the lab’s resources, the firms earn less than if
the lab is simply not available.
There is more in Examples 2 and 3 than an illustration of the applicability of the theoretical propo-
sitions to specific algebraic forms. Only in the latter example, where the probability of success of R&D
operations is assumed to be low, both the lab and its sponsor engage in R&D efforts. This outcome
is consistent with the empirical evidence (Guedj, 2005) that projects with a low probability of success
are more often conducted through a contractual alliance between a large firm and a smaller biotech
company (as in Example 3) than conducted entirely within the same entity (as in Example 2). The
comparison of examples 2 and 3 thus rationalizes the general observation that the reduction in drug
R&D productivity over the last decades – which is formally captured here by a lower probability of
success – has coincided with increasingly frequent situations where large pharma firms and smaller
external biotech units contribute jointly to research and development (Pisano, 2006; Rydzewski, 2008;
Scannell et al., 2012). This is a sufficiently high level of uncertainty, in our theoretical framework, that
triggers an investment by all industry participants.
Another interesting equilibrium property illustrated by examples 2 and 3 is that client firms (prin-
cipals), whose payments to the lab are truthful, are shielded from the uncertainty that is specific to
external R&D operations. The lab (agent), however, bears the risk inherent to its technological activ-
ities. When the equilibrium payoff to the lab, in expectation, is exactly zero (Proposition 2), then an
unfavorable draw necessarily yields a negative net return. To summarize:
Corollary 2 When R&D externalities are non-negative (e ≥ 0), efficient projects at the industry level are
vulnerable to unfavorable technological events that affect the external unit.
In order to avoid the abandonment of early-stage research projects, that are characterized by a
high degree of technological uncertainty, but also contribute positively to total industry profits, one
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can think of some safeguarding measures that were not considered in our model specifications –
including public intervention. Such measures, in light of our results and their connections to the
empirical evidence, appear less relevant for clinical trials than for early-stage research activities char-
acterized by significant economies of scope and technological spillovers. The financial back-up of a
partner university, as commonly observed in the early stages of startups since emergence of biotech-
nology in the late 1970s, can thus be interpreted in retrospect as a relevant attempt to insure promis-
ing spin-offs from unfavorable events. This interpretation however does not apply to direct cash
subsidies, since in our model they would only lower the lab’s break-even point, to the benefit of
client firms.
We now consider cases with increasing returns to R&D.






= xi + yi. We identify simple conditions for Propositions 2 and 3 to remain valid.









The interplay of contracted-out and internal R&D levels is central to our results.
From Proposition 1, we know that increasing R&D returns imply that
dy∗j
dxj
≥ 0, which is sufficient
to obtain that dg˜idxj has the same sign as
∂gˆi
∂xj
and ∂gˆi∂yj (see Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.3). As for the sign
of dg˜idxi , it depends also on
dy∗j
dxi
. There are two cases. If xj and xi are complementary inside firm i’s gross
payoff function, so that ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
≥ 0, then y∗j is monotone increasing in xi, that is
dy∗j
dxi
≥ 0. It follows
that dg˜idxi has the same sign as
∂gˆi
∂xj
and ∂gˆi∂yj (see Lemma A.2), and Propositions 2 and 3 remain valid with
non-decreasing returns as well. When xi and xj are substitutable, in that
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
< 0, then y∗j decreases
in xi, that is
dy∗j
dxi
< 0. Here more R&D purchased from the lab reduces the other firm’s internal R&D




are both positive. The latter property however does not occur when the substitution





The next example illustrates all cases predicted by Proposition 4. It shows that while external
and internal R&D tasks are complementary (a consequence of non-decreasing returns to R&D from
Proposition 1), the client firms fully appropriate industry profit (as in Proposition 2) or concede to
the lab a positive share of it (as in Proposition 3).
Example 4  The cost of the external lab is f0(x) = (x1 + x2)2 − δx1x2/2, with δ ≥ 0, and the internal
R&D cost is fi(yi) = κ + y2i , i = 1, 2, with κ > 0. The marginal cost of operations is ci(x) = (c− si − βsj),
with c > 0, with an inter-firm spillover parameter β ∈ [0, 1] as in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), and
where si = xi + yi can be interpreted as the sum of R (that is, xi) and D (yi) as in Vonortas (1994). The final-
market inverse demand is p(q) = a− qi − qj, with a > c. Non-cooperative profit maximization in quantities
leads to q∗i (x, y) =
[
(a− c) + si (2− β) + sj (2β− 1)
]
/3. We have ∂2 gˆi/∂s2i = 2 (2− β)2 /9 > 0, so
condition (21) is satisfied for all parameter values (increasing R&D returns). Then, whether Proposition 2
or 3 applies depends on δ and β: (i) if δ ≥ 1 (< 1) then condition (12) (resp. condition (16)) holds; (ii) if
β ≥ 1/2 (< 1/2) then condition (13) (resp. condition (17)) holds, directly from ∂gˆi/∂xj = ∂gˆi/∂yj =
(2/3) (2β− 1) q∗i (x, y). Moreover, ∂2 gˆi/∂xj∂xi = (2/9) (2− β) (2β− 1) ≥ 0 only if β ≥ 1/2, and we
have dy∗j /dxi = 3 (2β− 1) (β− 2) /
[(
β2 − β+ 7) (β2 − 3β− 1)] > −1 for β < 1/2. Therefore, in this
example the non-negative R&D externalities case of Proposition 2 applies if β ≥ 1/2 and δ ≥ 1, and the
negative externalities case of Proposition 3 applies if β < 1/2 and δ < 1. 
An important lesson of Propositions 2 and 3 is that the interplay of indirect (through the lab)
and direct (inter-firm) technological externalities drives the additivity status of the value function v
in (9), which in the end determines the distibution of industry profits. This characterization applies
in all situations where the two types of externalities have the same sign, as formalized by the easy-
to-use benchmark conditions (12-13) and (16-17). It applies also in “mixed” cases where indirect
externalities are negative, while direct externalities are not, or vice versa.
For an illustration, consider again the previous example by setting δ = β = 0, but by assum-
ing that the firms rely exclusivey on the exernal lab (y1 = y2 = 0), so that their gross reduced-form
profits are similar to the ones considered in Ho (2009).38 Here we have non-negative indirect but neg-
ative direct externalities (∂2 f0/∂x1∂x2 = 0 and ∂gˆi/∂xj < 0 for all positive final-market quantities).
38In Ho (2009) the magnitude of the cost reduction, as obtained from the external lab, is specified to be exogenous
(whereas it is chosen by the for-profit lab in the present case), and the final market inverse demand function involves a
slope parameter b (which is set equal to 1 here).
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Simple computations lead to v({1}) = v({2}) = (a− c)2 /5, and Λ = (a− c)2 /4, a case of strict




0/3 = (a− c)2 /20.
5 Incentives for More Integration
The distribution of industry profits can be modified either by a coordination of contract offers by the
two firms, or by a shift to a more vertically integrated structure that unifies the lab with one of the two
firms, or both. In this section we investigate the link between the sign of technological externalities
and incentives for more integration of some kind in the intermediate R&D market.39
Suppose that the owners of the three entities can participate in the equity market in order to possi-
bly depart from the initial outsourcing equilibrium characterized in the previous section. We assume
that (i) initially, each entity is owned by distinct sets of individuals (no one can simultaneously be
a seller and a buyer); (ii) when the lab and only one firm integrate vertically, the unified entity can
agree to supply R&D to the other firm by bargaining with it over the sharing of industry profits; and
(iii) transaction costs are nil.
Consider first the situation in which the lab and the two firms all participate in some form of in-
tegration on the intermediate R&D market. This occurs if the lab acquires the two firms and controls
them as subsidiaries, or if the two firms share the ownership of the lab and control it as a joint venture,
with choices of internal R&D and final-market strategies remaining non cooperative (no collusion).
In these two cases there is no gain in joint profits to be earned vis-a`-vis equilibrium payoffs of the
common agency structure. This is because the truthfulness of the firms’ equilibrium payment strate-
gies implies that the lab is offered two transfer schedules which exactly reflect the respective shapes
of the firms’ gross profit functions (that is, g˜i (x)
.
= gˆi(xi + y∗i (x), xj, y
∗
j (x)) − fi (y∗i (x)), i = 1, 2). The
lab thereby internalizes both direct and indirect externalities, and thus is incentivized to supply R&D
outputs that maximize the joint profits of all participants.40 It follows that the net residual share of
39Our choice to characterize first the equilibrium profit distribution in the decentralized common agency setting, before
investigating incentives to integrate in the intermediate market for new biotechnology, reflects industry practice (Folta,
1998; Danzon and Grabowski, 2012).
40To compare, in Spulber (2013) joint profits are not maximized when an upstream inventor charges a two-part royalty
(an up-front lump-sum royalty and a royalty per unit of output produced with its cost-reducing innovation) to downstream
firms, which sell differentiated products in the final market. A positive per-unit royalty is chosen as it results in an implicit
collusion mechanism from which the inventor benefits through the lump-sum royalty. The per-unit royalty implies double
marginalization, and hence suboptimal profits at the industry level.
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joint profits accruing to each buyer of another firm’s equity cannot improve on the amount of net
profits received in the common agency equilibrium. Forward integration (i.e., the two users become
subsidiaries of the lab) would imply the payment of v∗i by the lab to the firms’ owners. Backward
integration (i.e., the lab becomes a joint venture) would require the total payment of v∗0 by the two
firms for the ownership of the upstream assets. The equality v∗0 + v∗1 + v
∗
2 = Λ holds in all cases,
unless further assumptions are introduced (e.g., cost or demand parameters become a function of the
governance structure). More formally:
Proposition 5 In the initial outsourcing situation, the firms’ non-cooperative equilibrium transfer pay-
ments and the lab’s individual profit-maximizing R&D outputs x˜ result in a maximum industry profit: x˜ ∈
arg maxx∈X (g˜1 (x) + g˜2 (x)− f0(x)). Therefore, unless the firms coordinate internal R&D operations (y) or
collude in final-market commercial decisions (z), there is no incentive for the lab to acquire the two firms and
control them as subsidiaries, nor for the firms to share the ownership of the lab and control it as a joint venture.
In other words, the integration of all market participants is profitable only if the firms neutral-
ize downstream strategic interactions by coordinating internal R&D activities or/and final-market
strategies.
It remains to investigate all alternative forms of integration that can allow the respective owners
of the lab, or of the two firms, to privately appropriate a larger share of the industry maximum Λ
than in the decentralized outsourcing initial situation. Toward an equilibrium industry structure
in the equity market, we consider the following discrete set of possible arrangements: the horizontal
integration of firms 1 and 2 for the joint procurement of external R&D (internal R&D and final-market
choices remaining non cooperative), the vertical integration of the lab with firm 1, or with firm 2. We
consider in turn the situations in which the value function v (in (9)) is superadditive (e ≥ 0, as in
Proposition 2), then strictly subadditive (e < 0, as in Proposition 3), depending on the interplay
of indirect (through the lab) and direct (inter-firm) technological externalities. The two cases are
illustrated respectively by Figures 1 and 2, which represent the space of possible partitions of the
maximum industry profit Λ as a 2-simplex, with full appropriation by the lab (i.e., v0 = Λ) at the top
vertex, and by either of the two firms at the bottom vertices. More generally, the payoffs to the lab
and each of the two firms are proportional to the distance of the allocation point to the edge opposite
to their respective vertex.
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Non-negative R&D externalities When indirect and direct R&D externalities are both non-
negative, or in “mixed” situations with positive and negative externalities where the former dom-
inate, so that v is superadditive (e ≥ 0), from Proposition 2 the lab only breaks even in equilibrium
of the common agency structure, that is v∗0 = 0, and the two firms thus appropriate the maximized
industry profit, v∗1 + v
∗
2 = Λ (where v
∗
i ≥ vi, k = 1, 2).
As there exists a continuum of firm equilibrium payoffs, the exact distribution (v∗1 , v
∗
2) can only
reflect circumstances outside of the initial model specifications. Hereafter we formalize such circum-
stances by the bargaining powers (φ1, φ2) in [0, 1]2, with φ1 + φ2 = 1. They verify
v∗k = vk + φk (Λ− v) , (22)
where k = 1, 2, and (v1, v2) is the disagreement point, with v
.
= v1 + v2, so that,
φk =
v∗k − vk
Λ− v . (23)
Although with non-negative externalities joint R&D procurement cannot increase the firms’ joint
profit, a larger individual share can be earned by a firm if it deviates unilaterally from the outsourc-
ing equilibrium to acquire the lab. By exclusively controlling of the lab, the vertically integrated
entity {0, i} benefits from a stronger bargaining position. In case of disagreement its payoff becomes
v ({i}) ≥ vi, while its rival j’s payoff remains at vj, the standalone value. The bargaining process, in
case of vertical integration, thus determines a payoff to the unified entity equal to
v{0,i}0+i = v ({i}) + φi
(
Λ− v ({i})− vj
)
≥ v∗i , (24)
and a payoff to the outsider equal to
v{0,i}j = vj + φj
(
Λ− v ({i})− vj
)





as defined in (23), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.41
41Given that in (25) firm j has the same disagreement value vj as in the initial outsourcing equilibrium, a strict inequality











As they face two competing alternatives, the lab’s owners can choose the firm to integrate with.42
By selling out to firm i, they earn v{0,i}0 = v
{0,i}
0+i − v{0,i}i , the difference beween the payoff to the unified
entity and the acquirers’ residual claim. The two firms’ respective owners thus compete in the equity
market, and their willingness to pay is the difference between the value they generate by acquiring
the lab and the value they earn should the lab integrate with the other firm. In comparison to the
initial equilibrium situation, the firm that does not integrate, say firm j, is forced to concede what the
other firm appropriates by acquiring the lab. Firm i’s willingness to pay, as an acquirer, is thus the
sum of what it appropriates, and what the other would have appropriated, that is





i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. Therefore, although firms are asymmetric, and thus appropriate different amounts
by acquiring the lab, the willingness to pay is the same across the two firms. Then competition in the
equity market results in the integration of the lab with any of the two firms, indifferently.
In the equilibrium industry structure, the winning firm i’s owners have bidden their willingness
to pay so they receive only v{0,j}i ≤ v∗i , and the rival j’s owners, by contracting out for R&D with the
integrated entity {0, i}, earn only v{0,i}j ≤ v∗j . The lab’s owners earn a payoff equal to the common











1 − v1) ≥ v∗0 = 0, (27)
with a strict inequality in all non-degenerate cases where v ({1}) + v ({2}) > v. Then, even if v∗i = vi
for some i = 1, 2, the inequality in (27) remains strict (necessarily v∗j − vj = Λ− v− (v∗i − vi) > 0).
The lab’s owners, whose payoffs are nil in the initial R&D market equilibrium, eventually extract a
positive share of industry profits in the equity market (point V in Figure 1). Eventually, this outcome
points to long-term incentives to invest in early-stage research activities (discovery), although the
short-term profitability is nil (see Proposition 2).
42For completeness, if the exclusive control of the lab strictly dominates the standalone option only for firm i, so that
v ({i}) > vi and v ({j}) = vj, then v{0,j}0+j = v∗j . As there is no incentive for the latter firm j to integrate vertically, in that
case firm i acquires the lab (it pays ε > v∗0 = v
{1,2}
0 = 0 with ε arbitrarily small), and the equilibrium structure is {0, i}, with
payoffs as in (24-25). If there is no gain to the exclusive control of the lab for both firms, so that v ({i}) = vi as well, then



































Figure 1: v is superadditive (e ≥ 0), so the loci for v ({1}) and v ({2}) intersect inside the simplex. In the initial
equilibrium (point I), the firms fully appropriate industry profits (v∗1 + v∗2 = Λ), so the lab exactly breaks even (v∗0 = 0).
Should a firm integrate the lab at no cost, it would appropriate more industry profits (point A for firm 1, or B for firm 2).
However, competition in the equity market lowers firms’ payoffs to v{0,j}i , for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, and in the lab to appropriate
positive profits, that is v{0,1}0 = v
{0,2}
0 > 0 (point V).
Negative R&D externalities When indirect and direct R&D externalities are both negative, or
in “mixed” situations with positive and negative externalities where the latter dominate, so that v
is strictly subadditive (e < 0), from Proposition 3 the equilibrium payoffs in the initial outsourcing
situation are v∗0 = |e| > 0, and v∗i = v({i}) − |e| ≥ vi, i = 1, 2, so that v∗1 + v∗2 < Λ. As an
alternative to the initial outsourcing situation, the firms can opt for an horizontal arrangement in
order to procure jointly external R&D. In that case they behave cooperatively as a unique principal on
the intermediate market for technology, and fully appropriate the maximum industry profit, with the





Λ (here the superscript {1, 2} refers to the industry structure with firms 1 and 2 procuring jointly).
The initial outsourcing equilibrium payoffs determine the firms’ disagreement point (v∗1 , v
∗
2)when
43A horizontal arrangement here relates to the intermediate market for technology, as opposed to the final market for
products, where the firms are assumed to remain competitors. This situation is similar to the cases observed by Majewski
(2004) where firms engaged in a technology alliance jointly choose to outsource their R&D to a third party in order to split
costs.
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k +ωk (Λ− v∗1 − v∗2) , (28)
where k = 1, 2, implying that bargaining powers (ω1,ω2) in [0, 1]2, with ω1 +ω2 = 1, are
ωk =
v{1,2}k − v∗k





































Figure 2: v is strictly subadditive (e < 0), so the loci for v ({1}) and v ({2}) intersect outside the simplex. In the initial
R&D equilibrium (point I) the firms earn v∗i = v({i})− |e|, i = 1, 2, and the lab earns v∗0 > 0. By agreeing horizontally
to coordinate R&D outsourcing, the firms fully reappropriate industry profits (point H). Should a firm integrate vertically
with the lab, at no cost, it would increase profits (point A for firm 1, or B for firm 2). The bidding contest to acquire the lab
leads both firms to earn v0,ji , i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i (point V) in the equilibrium industry structure.
From Proposition 3 we know that v∗0 = Λ− v∗1 − v∗2 > 0, implying that in (28) we have v{1,2}k ≥ v∗k
for k = 1, 2, with a strict inequality sign for at least one firm, implying that at least one firm earns a
positive gain by shifting to the horizontal arrangement. Moreover, the definition of e in (10) together
with v∗i = v({i})− |e| in (18) imply that v∗j = Λ− v ({i}), so that v{1,2}j ≥ v∗j and v{1,2}j = Λ− v{1,2}i
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lead to v{1,2}i ≤ v ({i}), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, again with a strict inequality sign for at least one firm. It
follows that
v({k})− |e| ≤ v{1,2}k ≤ v ({k}) , (30)
where k = 1, 2, with at least one strict inequality sign. In (30) the first inequality states that any
situation resulting in lower individual payoffs than in the initial equilibrium is rejected. The second
inequality indicates that each firm’s payoff in the horizontal arrangement is bounded from above by
v ({i}), the value generated when it acquires the external lab without contracting with its rival.
While the two firms’ joint profit is maximized in the horizontal arrangement, each firm has an
incentive to depart unilaterally from {1, 2} by acquiring the lab, for a strictly44 higher disagreement
payoff v ({i}) > v∗i accruing to the integrated entity {0, i}, and a (weakly) lower disagreement payoff
vj ≤ v∗j to the other firm. By controlling the lab and benefitting exclusively from its technology, in
case of disagreement the integrated entity can guarantee for itself the upper bound of the horizon-
tal arrangement payoff in (30), while the outsider earns only its standalone value. The bargaining
process, with vertical integration, implies a payoff to the unified entity equal to
v{0,i}0+i = v ({i}) +ωi
(
Λ− v ({i})− vj
)
> v{1,2}i , (31)
and a payoff to the outsider equal to
v{0,i}j = vj +ωj
(
Λ− v ({i})− vj
)
< v{1,2}j , (32)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.45 The lab’s owners, as in the non-negative externalities situation of the previous
section, can thus make the two firms compete in the equity market by soliciting bids in order to
reappropriate a positive share of industry profits. Provided that no restriction is introduced that
limits payment offers, again the firms have the same willingness to pay for the lab, that is





44In this negative externalities situation (e .= Λ− v ({i})− v ({j}) < 0) we have v ({i}) > Λ− v ({j}) = v∗i .
45The strict inequality sign in (32) is a consequence of v ({i}) > v∗i ≥ vi, and possibly of firm j’s strictly lower disagree-
ment value vj < v∗j (this differs from the non-negative externalities case in (25)). Then the strict inequality in (31) follows
















i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, and any of them becomes the acquirer with equiprobability. The payoffs structure
already obtained in the non-negative externalities case thus prevails, with each firm’s owners earning






2 , in any of the two possible equilibrium
industry structures.
However, with negative externalities it is not a priori established that the lab’s owners are better-
off post integration than in the initial outsourcing equilibrium. Inserting the expression of the firms’















≥ v∗0 = |e| > 0. (34)
This establishes that, although in the negative externalities case the lab’s owners earn positive profits
in the initial outsourcing equilibrium, they can extract more value by selling out to any of the two
(possibly asymmetric) client firms, indifferently (from I to V in Figure 2).
To summarize:
Proposition 6 Suppose that the exclusive control of the lab strictly dominates a firm’s standalone option
(v ({i}) > vi, i = 1, 2):
(1) If the firms can commit not to integrate the lab they fully appropriate industry profits: (i) with non-
negative R&D externalities (e ≥ 0), the firms remain independent and the initial outsourcing equilibrium
prevails; (ii) with negative R&D externalities (e < 0), the firms engage in the horizontal arrangement {1, 2}
to coordinate external technology sourcing; (iii) in both cases the firms fully appropriate industry value Λ,
and the lab earns inf{v∗0 , v{1,2}0 } = 0.
(2) Otherwise, independently of the sign of R&D externalities, one of the two firms acquires the lab with the
same probability 1/2, and competition in the equity market drives firms’ payoffs down to v{0,2}1 and v
{0,1}
2 ,
with v{0,2}1 + v
{0,1}
2 < Λ, to the benefit of the lab’s owners who extract Λ− v{0,2}1 − v{0,1}2 ≥ v∗0 .
The latter results point to several simple empirical implications that connect technological char-
acteristics to the type of acquisitions that modify the structure of the market for technology. In Propo-
sition 6-(1) we focus on cases where the firms, for some exogenous reasons (e.g., a regulation, or a
strategic orientation), rule out the possibility to acquire the lab. When technological externalities
are non-negative (e ≥ 0), because multi-client R&D operations benefit from economies of scope, or
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inter-firm knowledge spillovers are significant, then the industry structure is more likely to remain
decentralized with no downstream coordination. In the alternative where externalities are negative
(e < 0), the firms are more likely to coordinate technology sourcing from the same external lab. This
second category of situations is reminicent of Majewski (2004), where evidence is found that “when
collaborative agreements involve firms that compete in downstream markets, they tend to outsource
their collaborative R&D to a third party” (p. 2).
Moreover, in Proposition 6-(2) we learn that competition among client firms is more profitable to
the lab’s owners in the equity market than in the R&D market, independently of the identity of the
acquirer. Competition is tougher in the equity market, as only one firm can acquire the lab, whereas
in the R&D market firms can partially reconcile their antagonism through finely tuned contract offers.
As discussed from an empirical perspective by Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), the firms overbid for
the external unit, and the acquirer succumbs to the winner’s curse. More recently, Pisano (2015) also
reflected on whether “pharmaceutical companies [are] paying more for R&D by acquiring companies
than by carrying out the R&D themselves”. According to our result, pharmaceutical companies pay
more for R&D by acquiring an external unit in the market for equity than by contracting in the market
for technology. This theoretical outcome points to the exit payoff as a long-term financial incentive
that can motivate the foundation of a new biotech company in the first place.
Finally, note that Proposition 6 is derived under the assumption that bids are unrestricted. How-
ever, in real-world business circumstances a financial constraint might be introduced that limits
firms’ ability to compete for the control of an external entity. In the theoretical context of the model,
the effect of such a constraint can be investigated by assuming that the payoff to the lab’s owners, in
case of vertical integration, cannot be so high as to imply a lower payoff to the acquiring firm than in
the initial outsourcing equilibrium. Formally, the two firms’ respective financial constraints are thus
v∗i ≤ v{0,i}i = Λ− v{0,i}j − v{0,i}0 , (35)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. In principle such a constraint makes it more difficult for a firm to acquire the lab
when the latter makes positive profits than when it exactly breaks even. It also helps identifying the
profile of the most agressive bidder. With non-negative R&D externalities (e ≥ 0), as Λ− v∗i = v∗j
from Proposition 2, firm i’s constraint in (35) becomes v{0,i}0 ≤ v∗j − v{0,i}j . In other words, firm i’s
maximum bid, when it acquires the lab, must not exceed what firm j has lost, as an outsider, because
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of the change in bargaining positions vis-a`-vis the outsourcing situation. By using (22) and (25), firm
i’s financial constraint can thus be rewritten v{0,i}0 ≤ φj (v ({i})− vi), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. The lab’s












The comparison in (36) predicts that the acquirer is the firm whose net equilibrium payoff in the
initial outsourcing situation (that is v∗i − vi), relatively to the net profit that the integrated entity can
guarantee for itself (v ({i})− vi), is lower.
With negative R&D externalities (e < 0), the same reasoning starting from (35) leads to the fol-
lowing condition for firm i to be the one that acquires the lab:
v{1,2}i − vi
v({i})− |e| − vi
≤
v{1,2}j − vj
v({j})− |e| − vj
. (37)
Here the acquirer is the firm whose relative gain in the horizontal arrangement (that is v{1,2}i − vi),
relatively to the initial equilibrium net payoff (v∗i − vi = v({i})− |e| − vi), is lower. The theoretical
prediction of conditions (36 - 37) is compatible with the empirical evidence that the most active firms
in the equity market are not the ones with the highest profit prospects nor the deepest pockets. In
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), the firms experiencing a deterioration of their research pipeline are
found to be more likely to engage in the acquisition of a biotech entity. In Danzon, Epstein, and
Nicholson (2007), the financially strong firms appear to be less likely to engage in acquisitions.
6 Conclusion
We construct a model where two firms can choose to source technology from an external for-profit
unit, and also engage in internal R&D, before competing in a final market. In this theoretical frame-
work, our analysis offers a rationalization of the general proposition that, depending on specific cir-
cumstances, outsourced and in-house R&D operations might prove substitutable or complementary,
as substantiated by the most recent empirical evidence in the biopharmaceutical context (Hagedoorn
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and Wang, 2012; Ceccagnoli, Higgins, and Palermo, 2014). In our formal setting, although each
firm’s internal equilibrium effort is monotonic with the external unit’s activity, the direction of the
monotonicity is formally ambiguous because it depends on profit functions being characterized by
decreasing or increasing returns to R&D. Therefore, in the latter case which is commonly associated
with those process or product innovations with most potential, the choice by big pharma firms to
contract with an external unit should not be interpreted as a form of disinvestment. It corresponds
to circumstances where external R&D complements, rather than substitutes for, internal operations.
We also derive formal conditions for the industry profit to be either fully absorbed downstream,
or partly appropriated by the external unit. These conditions, which match remarkably well the
empirical evidence, only depend on the sign and magnitude of indirect (through the unit) and direct
(inter-firm) technological externalities. First, if an aggregate measure of such externalities is negative,
we find that strong competition among client firms leads the external unit to earn positive profits.
This case of negative externalities points to clinical trial activities (development), where diseconomies
of scope and limited or nonexistent inter-firm spillovers were identified in empirical studies of refer-
ence (Danzon et al. 2005; Macher and Boerner, 2006). We identify situations where for any probability
of success the external unit appropriates all of the profits, in a “buyer’s market” where client firms
behave as principals and are no less informed than the external unit. However, the model also shows
circumstances where positive externalities soften inter-firm competition in contract offers, so that
the external unit exactly breaks even in equilibrium. It follows that incentives to invest upstream are
delinked from the value of the knowledge generated by the external unit to its downstream sponsors,
and the ability of investors to realize a non-negative net return is highly vulnerable to unfavorable
events. The formal conditions that characterize such circumstances capture cases of economies of
scope in biotech projects, and of significant technological spillovers among pharma firms, such as
evidenced in drug discovery (research) activities by several important empirical papers (Henderson
and Cockburn, 1996; Cockburn and Henderson, 2001; Bloom et al., 2013).
But still, positive incentives to invest can be identified – including in cases of early-stage re-
search – that relate to the equity market, where several possible industry configurations emerge in
our model, in accordance with the large variety of restructuring activities observed in the biophar-
maceutical context (Danzon and Grabowski, 2012). Depending on the sign of the technological ex-
ternalities, the initial decentralized outsourcing scenario might prevail, or firms might engage in a
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horizontal agreement for the coordination of technology outsourcing. When the firms cannot commit
not to acquire the external unit, vertical integration occurs and a bidding war leads the acquirer to
overpay its target. This result gives theoretical support to the observation that real-world biotech
owners are likely to extract – or reappropriate – more industry value by selling their assets to big
pharma firms than by running R&D projects.
Overall, our formal analysis offers a new rationale for the low average profitability of the science-
based businesses of biotech observed since the emergence of genetic engineering in the 1970s (Pisano,
2006, 2010). In light of our results, and their connection with empirical observations, we believe that
limited financial returns should not be seen as evidence of disappointing technological progress, but
can be interpreted as a confirmation that economies of scope and knowledge spillovers have been
significant in the biotechnology domain. Indeed, in such circumstances, which seem not to generalize
to the market for clinical trial services, our propositions show that the decision by competing firms to
outsource early-stage research activities to a common external unit results in most value – possibly
very substantial – to be earned by the large downstream sponsors.
The delinkage of upstream investment incentives from total industry value, and the vulnerability
of investors’ net returns to negative shocks, both suggest the abandonment of projects precisely in
those early-stage areas that can generate critical advances toward new treatments or preventives. An
important consequence is that, although the internalization of indirect (through the lab) and direct
(inter-firm) positive externalities is a source of efficiency gains, and the long-term perspective of
selling out assets induces incentives to start a biotech unit, R&D outsourcing may not always qualify
as a relevant pathway to address the declining productivity in innovation issue that has characterized
the industry over several decades.
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A Appendix















As the arguments xi and yi enter additively into gi (hence gˆi), we have
∂gˆi
(





































result from the two firms’ non-
cooperative profit-maximization in their respective internal R&D levels, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
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Differentiating (38) and (39) w.r.t. xj, and using again si
.
= xi + yi in gˆi, and sj
.
= xj + yj in gˆj, we
obtain the system of equations ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂yj ∂2 gˆi∂x2i − ∂2 fi∂y2i
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j






























= fi (y∗i ), and f j
.
= f j(y∗j ), for clarity.
































































































< 0 (second-order condition), which






have the same sign (by assumption),
∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂yj ∥∥∥ and∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂x2j
∥∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂yi ∥∥∥ (see (7)), we obtain from (41) that ∆ ≥ 0.46





cross “correctly”, so that the Nash equilibrium (y∗i , y
∗












xi + yi, xj, yj
)− fi (yi)]
∂yi∂yj
∣∣∣∣∣ < 1, (44)
for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
46From the expression in (2), the argument si
.
= xi + yi of the gross profit function gi, hence also of the reduced-form gˆi,
implies that inequalities (6 - 7) can be rewritten by substituting the derivatives with respect to xi for the ones with respect
to yi. Thus ∂2 gˆi/∂yi∂xi = ∂2 gˆi/∂x2i , ∂
2 gˆi/∂yi∂xj = ∂2 gˆi/∂xi∂xj, and ∂2 gˆi/∂yi∂yj = ∂2 gˆi/∂xi∂yj, for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. We
make use of these substitutions throughout the appendix.
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Again, the argument si
.





























≥ 0 for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i (partial cross-derivatives, for both firms, have the same sign
by assumption) imply from (41) that ∆ is nonzero at (y∗i , y
∗
j ), and the derivatives in (42) and (43) are
well defined.
Suppose now that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
is nonzero for i = 1, 2 (the case ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
= 0 is considered below in the proof of
Proposition 1). Then, a careful reorganization of terms in the expression of
dy∗j
dxj






































































Both expressions in (45) and (46) are well defined because the denominators of their respective
first terms are nonzero by assumption (second-order condition for a unique y∗(x)).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.




< 0 ⇔ ∂2 gˆi
∂s2i
< 0, where si
.



















= fi (y∗i ), and f j
.
= f j(y∗j ), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, throughout this section for




= 0. Recalling from si
.












, from (6) we have∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂yi∂xi ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂x2i ∥∥∥ = 0 ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂yi∂xj ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj ∥∥∥, implying that ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj = 0. Then, by inserting ∂2 gˆj∂x2j = 0 and
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj











< 0. (i) Here
∂2 fi(y∗i )
∂y2i









∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj ∥∥∥ by
assumption from (7) implies that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i











































Multiplying through by ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 f j
∂y2j





















































< 0, where the latter





































Multiplying through by ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 f j
∂y2j






on both sides of the inequality sign,












































in (47), (48) and (50), establishes Proposition 1. 
A.3 Lemmas
The technical results introduced in this section are needed to prove Propositions 2, 3, and 4. The first








= gˆi (x, y∗(x))− fi (y∗i (x)).
Lemma A.1 Suppose that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i




j )− fi(y∗i )]
dxj
















xi + yi, xj, yj












































= 0 (i = 1, 2), we know from (47) that
dy∗j
dxj




< 0 (i = 1, 2), we know from (48) that
dy∗j
dxj
≤ 0. Then toward a contradiction we
suppose that































have the same sign, and
∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj ∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂yj ∥∥∥ (model specifications in (6-7)), we
know that the expression on the LHS of the strict inequality sign in (57) is non-positive. However,
∂2 f j
∂y2j





< 0 (second-order condition) imply that the prod-
uct on the RHS is always non-negative, a contradiction. Hence
∥∥∥ dy∗jdxj ∥∥∥ ≤ 1. This, together with∥∥∥∥ ∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )∂xj
∥∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥∥ ∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )∂yj
∥∥∥∥ (model specifications), is sufficient to conclude that d[gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )− fi(y∗i )]dxj







Lemma A.2 Suppose that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
≤ 0, i = 1, 2. If ∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)∂xj ≥ 0 and
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂yj
≥ 0, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
then












xi + yi, xj, yj








































≥ 0 as an assumption of the








= 0 (i = 1, 2), we know from (47) that
dy∗j
dxi











































≥ 0 (i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i), as ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 f j
∂y2j




− ∂2 f j
∂y2j
)
≥ 0. Then, toward





















where the expression on the LHS of the inequality sign is non-negative, whereas the expression on
the RHS is non-positive, a contradiction. It follows that
dy∗j
dxi
≥ 0, which is sufficient to conclude
directly that
d[gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )− fi(y∗i )]
dxi












< 0 suppose that












































































both negative here. Moreover we know by assumption from (7) that
∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi
∂x2i

















































As the latter inequalities contradict the initial assumption in (6) that
∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂xi ∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂x2j
∥∥∥∥, it must be
the case that
∥∥∥ dy∗jdxi ∥∥∥ ≤ 1. This, together with the model specification in (4-5) that
∥∥∥∥ ∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )∂xi
∥∥∥∥ ≥∥∥∥∥ ∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )∂yj
∥∥∥∥, is sufficient to conclude that d[gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )− fi(y∗i )]dxi in (53) is non-negative. 
The next two lemmas were established in Laussel and Le Breton (2001). We restate them in the
notation of this paper for a self-contained appendix:47
Lemma A.3 If v is superadditive, that is Λ ≥ v({1}) + v({2}), then in all TSPNE v∗0 = 0, and all vectors
of equilibrium profits (v∗1 , v
∗





Lemma A.4 If v is strictly subadditive, that is Λ < v({1}) + v({2}), then in all TSPNE v∗0 > 0, and there




i = Λ− v({j}), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
A.4 Proof of Propositions 2, 3, and 4.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first extend a proof by Billette de Villemeur and Versaevel (2003,
Proposition 1) to establish the (weak) superadditivity of v(.). Then we show that the equilibrium
payoffs (v∗1 , v
∗
2) exist that are (weakly) higher than the respective standalone values (v1, v2).
1) Denote by X∗{i} the set of R&D levels that maximize the joint profit of firm i and the lab, that is







xi + yi, xj, yj
)− fi (yi)]− f0 (x)) .
47With two principals, the convexity condition introduced in Laussel and Le Breton (2001, Proposition 3.2, p. 103) coin-
cides with the superadditivity of v in our model, and the strong subadditivity property (Proposition 3.3, p. 104) coincides
here with strict subadditivity.
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Define a .= (a1, a2) ∈ X∗{1} and b
.
= (b1, b2) ∈ X∗{2}.
We know from the initial model specifications that
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂si
≥ 0, where si = xi + yi. More-
over, it is assumed in this proposition that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i




≥ 0 and ∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)∂yj ≥ 0 (non-negative R&D externalities). It follows that
gˆi(xi + y∗i (x) , xj, y
∗
j (x))− fi (y∗i (x)) is non-decreasing in xj from Lemma A.1, and in xi from Lemma
A.2. Therefore, for s .= (s1, s2), with s1
.
= a1 ∨ b1 and s2 .= a2 ∨ b2, we have
gˆ1 (a1 + y∗1 (a) , a2,y
∗
2 (a))− f1 (y∗1 (a)) ≤ gˆ1 (s1 + y∗1 (s) , s2,y∗2 (s))− f1 (y∗1 (s)) , (55a)
gˆ2 (b2 + y∗2 (b) , b1,y∗1 (b))− f2 (y∗2 (b)) ≤ gˆ2 (s2 + y∗2 (s) , s1,y∗1 (s))− f2 (y∗2 (s)) . (55b)
The non-negative cross-derivative in (12) implies the weak submodularity of f0 (Topkis, 1995). This
property, with (55a) and (55b), together lead to
gˆ1 (a1 + y∗1 (a) , a2,y
∗
2 (a))− f1 (y∗1 (a))− f0 (a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=v({1})
+ gˆ2 (b2 + y∗2 (b) , b1,y∗1 (b))− f2 (y∗1 (b))− f0 (b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=v({2})
≤ gˆ1 (s1 + y∗1 (s) , s2,y∗2 (s))− f1 (y∗1 (s)) + gˆ2 (s2 + y∗2 (s) , s1,y∗1 (s))− f2 (y∗2 (s))− f0 (s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤v({1,2})
− f0 (a ∧ b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
,
which in turn establishes that v({1}) + v({2}) ≤ v({1, 2}). Then the conclusion that v∗0 = 0 <
v∗1 + v
∗
2 = v({1, 2}) follows directly from Lemma A.3.
2) To check that v∗i ≥ vi, recall that firm i’s standalone value vi .= g˜j(x∗{j}), where x∗{j} ∈ arg maxx[g˜j (x)−
f0(x)], is the R&D outcomes when firm j is assumed to have exclusive access to the lab (for i, j = 1, 2,
j 6= i). Moreover, by assumption firm i’s exclusive control of the lab dominates the standalone value,
that is v({i}) ≥ vi. Then from the superadditivity of v(.), together with v∗1 + v∗2 = v({1, 2}) as
established above, we have directly
v1 + v2 ≤ v({1}) + v({2}) ≤ v({1, 2}) = v∗1 + v∗2 ,
and the equilibrium set {(v∗1 , v∗2) | v∗1 + v∗2 = Λ, v∗1 ≥ v1, v∗2 ≥ v2} is nonempty. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We first prove the strict subadditivity of v(.), before establishing that
the equilibrium payoffs (v∗1 , v
∗
2) are (weakly) higher than the respective standalone values (v1, v2).




{1,2}, the set of R&D levels that maximize industry profits.
It is assumed in this proposition that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i




≤ 0 and ∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)∂yj ≤ 0 (weakly negative R&D externalities). It follows from
Lemma A.1 that the net profit expression gˆi(xi + y∗i (x), xj, y
∗
j (x)) − fi (y∗i (x)) is non-decreasing so
56
that, for all x∗1 , x
∗
2 ≥ 0,
gˆ1 (x∗1 + y
∗
1 (x
∗) , x∗2 , y∗2 (x∗))− f1 (y∗1 (x∗)) ≤ gˆ1 (x∗1 + y∗1 (x∗1 , 0) , 0, y∗2 (x∗1 , 0))− f1 (y∗1 (x∗1 , 0)) , (56a)
gˆ2(x∗2 + y∗2 (x∗) , x∗1 , y
∗
1 (x
∗))− f2 (y∗2 (x∗)) ≤ gˆ2 (x∗2 + y∗2 (0, x∗2) , 0, y∗1 (0, x∗2))− f2 (y∗2 (0, x∗2)) . (56b)
The negative cross-derivative in (16) implies the strict supermodularity of f0 (Topkis, 1995), with
f0 (0, 0) = 0.




∗) , x∗2 , y∗2 (x∗))− f1 (y∗1 (x∗)) + gˆ2(x∗2 + y∗2 (x∗) , x∗1 , y∗1 (x∗))− f2 (y∗2 (x∗))− f0 (x∗1 , x∗2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=v({1,2})








1 , 0))− f1 (y∗1 (x∗1 , 0))− f0 (x∗1 , 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤v({1})
+ gˆ2 (x∗2 + y∗2 (0, x∗2) , 0, y∗1 (0, x
∗
2))− f2 (y∗2 (0, x∗2))− f0 (0, x∗2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤v({2})
,
which establishes that v ({1, 2}) < v ({1}) + v ({2}). Then the conclusion that v∗0 > 0 and v∗i =
Λ− v({j}), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, follows directly from Lemma A.4.
2) For any x∗{1} and x
∗
{2}, by definition of v(.) we have
g˜1(x∗{1}) + g˜2(x
∗
{1})− f0(x∗{1}) ≤ v({1, 2}),
g˜1(x∗{2}) + g˜2(x
∗
{2})− f0(x∗{2}) ≤ v({1, 2}).
Then by reorganizing terms, and recalling that v({i}) .= g˜i(x∗{i})− f0(x∗{i}) and vi
.
= g˜i(x∗{j}), where
x∗{j} ∈ arg maxx
[
g˜j (x)− f0 (x)
]
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, we obtain
v({1}) + v2 ≤ v({1, 2}),
v({2}) + v1 ≤ v({1, 2}),
which, together with v∗i = Λ− v({j}), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, as established above, implies that vi ≤ v∗i . 
Proof of Proposition 4. First, Lemma A.1 extends to the case ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
≥ 0 (i = 1, 2). Indeed we have
established in (47) that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i




= 0, and in (50) that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i




> 0. This is sufficient
to conclude directly that
d[gˆi(xi+y∗i (x),xj,y∗j (x))− fi(y∗i (x))]
dxj








To extend Lemma A.2 as well, note that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
≥ 0 (i = 1, 2) implies Nji∆ ≥ 0 in (54), because ∆ > 0
(from stability condition) and Nji ≥ 0 from ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 f j
∂y2j








≥ 0 then ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂yi ≥ 0 also (model specifications). As
Nji
∆ ≥ 0, we obtain that the expression
between brackets in (54) is positive. Moreover, ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 f j
∂y2j





− ∂2 f j
∂y2j
)−1




≥ 0, which is sufficient to conclude
directly that
d[gˆi(xi+y∗i (x),xj,y∗j (x))− fi(y∗i (x))]
dxi




≤ 0 then ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂yi ≤ 0 also (model specifications). As
Nji
∆ ≥ 0, again the expression between
brackets in (54) is positive. Moreover, ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 f j
∂y2j





− ∂2 f j
∂y2j
)−1




≤ 0, implying that
∥∥∥ dy∗jdxi ∥∥∥ = − dy∗jdxi .
So, recalling that
∥∥∥ ∂gˆi∂xj ∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂gˆi∂yj ∥∥∥ (model specifications in (6-7)), a sufficient condition for Lemma A.2




A.5 Proof of industry profit maximization result in Proposition 5.
Recall from the model specifications in Section 3 that, in equilibrium, for any given pair of transfer
payment functions (t˜1, t˜2) we know that x˜ is an element of X(t˜1, t˜2)
.
= arg maxx v0((x(t˜1, t˜2))), the
set of external R&D choices that maximize the lab’s profit. We want to demonstrate that x˜ is also an
element of X∗{1,2}
.
= arg maxx(g˜1(x) + g˜2(x) − f0(x)), the set of external R&D levels that maximize
industry profit. The proof is a simple adaptation, in the notation of our model, of a common agency
efficiency result in Bernheim and Whinston (1986b, Theorem 2, p. 14).
We suppose that x˜ /∈ X∗{1,2}, and look for a contradiction. In equilibrium the strategy t˜i is truthful
relative to x˜, that is t˜i(x) = sup{0, g˜i(x)− [g˜i(x˜)− t˜i(x˜)]}, implying that
g˜i(x)− g˜i(x˜) + t˜i(x˜) ≤ t˜i(x),
for all x. This holds in particular for any given x∗ ∈ X∗{1,2}, so that g˜i(x∗) − g˜i(x˜) + t˜i(x˜) ≤ t˜i(x∗),
i = 1, 2. Summing the latter inequality for the two firms, and subtracting f0(x∗) on each side, leads
to
g˜(x∗)− g˜(x˜) + t˜(x˜)− f0(x∗) ≤ t˜(x∗)− f0(x∗),
where g˜(x) .= g˜1(x) + g˜2(x), and t˜(x)
.
= t˜1(x) + t˜2(x). By introducing f0(x˜) on the left-hand side
58
only, and reorganizing terms, we obtain
[g˜(x∗)− f0(x∗)]− [g˜(x˜)− f0(x˜)] + t˜(x˜)− f0(x˜) ≤ t˜(x∗)− f0(x∗). (57)
Observe that x∗ ∈ X∗{1,2} and x˜ /∈ X∗{1,2} together imply that g˜(x∗)− f0(x∗) > g˜(x˜)− f0(x˜), which in
turn implies from (57) that t˜(x˜)− f0(x˜) < t˜(x∗)− f0(x∗). The latter comparison says that x˜ /∈ X(t˜1, t˜2),
a contradiction. Therefore, x˜ ∈ X∗{1,2}. 
A.6 Proof of v{0,1}0 = v
{0,2}
0 ≥ v∗0 = |e| > 0 in Proposition 6 (for e < 0).
Consider the negative technological externalities case (e < 0). Firm i faces two alternatives: if it is
the one that acquires the lab, as an integrated entity it earns Λ − v{0,i}j ; otherwise, as an outsider
firm it earns v{0,j}i . The difference of the latter two payoffs is firm i’s willingness to pay for the lab,
which is equal to the one of firm j. Therefore, competition for the acquisition of the lab implies that
in equilibrium v{0,i}0 = v
{0,j}
0 = Λ− v{0,2}1 − v{0,1}2 .
Suppose now that firm i is the one that acquires the lab, while firm j remains independent, i, j =
1, 2, j 6= i. In the latter industry structure, the integrated entity {0, i} and firm j bargain over the
value generated by the acquired lab, with respective disagreement payoffs v ({i}) and vj. Firm j’s
payoff is thus
v{0,i}j = vj + wj
(
Λ− vj − v ({i})
)
, (58)
where from (29) firm j’s bargaining power is
wj =
v{1,2}j − v∗j
Λ− v∗1 − v∗2
. (59)





Λ− v∗1 − v∗2






Λ− v∗1 − v∗2
(Λ− v2 − v ({1}))
)
,
















Then, recalling that v∗0 = |e| = v ({1}) + v ({2}) − Λ, and that Λ = v{1,2}1 + v{1,2}2 , after a few
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[v2 + v ({1})−Λ] ≤ 0. (60)
As the two added terms in (60) are symmetric, we focus on the first one:
(i) Consider the expression between square brackets. By definition ofΛ .= maxx (g˜1 (x) + g˜2 (x)− f0(x)),
we have Λ ≥ g˜1(x∗{2}) + g˜2(x∗{2}) − f0(x∗{2}), where x∗{2} ∈ arg maxx[g˜2 (x) − f0(x)]. Since v1 =
g˜1(x∗{2}) and v ({2}) = g˜2(x∗{2})− f0(x∗{2}), we have v1 + v ({2})−Λ ≤ 0.
(ii) Consider the numerator in the term between parentheses. From Proposition 3 we know that
v∗2 = Λ− v ({1}). Moreover, Λ− v∗1 − v∗2 = v∗0 > 0 implies from (28) that v{1,2}2 > v∗2 for all (ω1,ω2)
in (0, 1)2. It follows that v{1,2}2 > Λ− v ({1}), and it is sufficient to recall that v{1,2}2 = Λ− v{1,2}1 (the
lab makes no profit in the horizontal arrangement) to establish that v ({1})− v{1,2}1 > 0.
Therefore, (60) is always true, with a strict inequality sign whenever Λ > g˜i(x∗{i}) + g˜j(x
∗
{i}) −
f0(x∗{i}), for some i = 1, 2, j 6= i. 
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